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Environmental degradation is the result of complex human-environment dynamics, often sustained by socio-economic inequalities. Recently microfinance has been proposed to be an interesting tool to support environmental protection strategies that aim at once to foster rural development and promote ecosystems conservation or adaptation to climate change.
In this paper we provide one of the first analysis of the link between microfinance and ecosystems conservation. We base our analysis on the assessment of the first large-scale microfinance programme for biodiversity conservation: Proyecto CAMBio. Our empirical analysis exploits a unique set of secondary and primary data collected by the authors in Nicaragua and Guatemala. We introduce a theoretical framework and a practical methodology to assess such programme, and we apply it to our case studies. Even if with different peculiarities, the two cases studied show that microfinance for ecosystems conservation has good potentialities to introduce environmental elements in the rural activities of small farmers and in the products provided by microfinance institutions, and it is an interesting path to pursue. However, they also underline that choices and actions of rural households and local financial intermediary institutions are strongly influenced by habits and local dominant development pathways, which are among the main causes of socio-economic inequalities and environmental degradation. Green Microfinance per se does not seem to be able to revert such dangerous dynamics while, interacting with them without a proactive strategy, it risks to have no effect or eventually support the causes of environmental degradation.
We then call for a renewed proactive role of green microfinance for ecosystems that, articulating with local actors and territorial dynamics, should aim not only at providing a green product to individual farmers, but instead support new alliances and collective, socially informed, actions to redirect the habits that support environmental degradation towards environmentally friendly and socio-economic inclusive rural development.
Introduction
The current market economy contributes to material wealth for part of the world population, but at the same time it sustains socio-economic inequalities (Wade, 2002; UNIneq, 2013) and environmental degradation (MEA, 2005; FRA, 2010) . Climate Change is one of the many examples of these side effects (AR5, 2013 ; AR5, 2014) : it is caused by the human economic activities that are part of an unsustainable development model and it affects more the ones that contributed the least to it: the rural poor in developing countries.
In the modern development discourse, environmental degradation is often seen as a market externality, because costs and benefits related to environment conservation are not considered in economic transactions: there is no owner of the environment, neither a clear price for it. Payments for Environmental Services (PES), like the international CO2 market, reward practices that provide environmental services (ES) to humans assigning a price and owner for ES. PES are often claimed to be effective financial mechanisms to internalize environmental externalities into economic transactions and efficiently allocate the optimum amount of ES and environmental capital needed by humans (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002) .
Moreover in developing countries environmental degradation is often linked to poverty and socioeconomic inequalities (Hall et. al., 2008) . The lack of financial capital prevents micro-entrepreneurs to invest in more efficient and less polluting technologies and activities, while the lack of human capital often constraints poor households to old inefficient traditional practices and technologies and precludes the undertaking of more environmentally friendly or economically rewarding activities. A popular strategy pushed forward by the modern development discourse to offset such barriers is "microfinance plus" (Sievers and Vandenberg 2007 ; : a mix of microfinance (MF) services for financial inclusion, and technical assistance (TA) to improve practices, choices and possibilities for poor households and foster their socio-economic empowerment.
In particular, MF plus programmes for ecosystems conservation have very recently started to enter in the development agenda; some programmes have been already discussed and implemented (EcoMicro; MebA; PCAMBio; PC, 2014; Forcella, 2012; Lucheschi, 2014; Cranford and Mourato, 2014 ; . They aim at the triple bottom line: profit-people-planet, and to foster environmentally friendly rural development, biodiversity and ecosystem conservation and support Climate Change adaptation mechanisms at household level. More broadly, microfinance strategies that pursue a triple bottom line -not only related to ecosystems or climate change, but also to access to clean energy, energy efficient devices, green policies, environmental risk management, etc. -have recently attracted much attention and are generally referred as "green microfinance" (Hall, 2008; Schuite and Pater, 2008; Allet, 2014) .
In this paper we would like to provide one of the first analysis of the outcomes and procedures of such programmes reviewing the implementation of Proyecto CAMBio: the first large scale programme that combines MF, TA, partial guaranty, and PES, with the aim of fostering biodiversity conservation and environmentally friendly land-use practices. The programme has been implemented in Central America between 2007 and 2013.
We exploit a unique set of primary and secondary data collected by the two authors in Nicaragua and Guatemala, and in particular 174 one to one interviews with clients, but also loan officers, managers of microfinance institutions (MFIs) and other relevant actors.
The aim of this paper is twofold: at theoretical level we would like to provide a framework based on the complex-system theory (Ramalingam and Jones, 2008; Ambrosio-Albalá and Bastiaensen, 2010) , and the habits-development pathways analysis (Hiedanpaa and Bromley, 2014; to discuss potentialities and outcomes of microfinance plus programmes for ecosystem conservation at territorial level. At the practical level we would like to introduce a ! 2 methodology and a simple framework that could be used by other researchers, consultants, development agencies and so on to analyse pro and cons of other similar programmes.
We apply such theoretical framework and practical methodology to Proyecto CAMBio in Nicaragua and Guatemala. We conclude that MF programmes for ecosystems conservation have good potentialities to contribute to the introduction of environmental practices into rural activities of small farmer and into products and procedures of MFIs. However, we observe the limitations of such tools, and more in general of incentives targeting individual actors, to revert the causes of unequal development and environment degradation. In particular we point out that without a clear set of collective and territorial strategies, embedded in the local socio-economic dynamics, the potential beneficial outcomes of such programmes risk to be lost, and the operations of the programmes themselves risk to indirectly support a « business as usual scenario » and hence the destructive, socially excluding dynamics that they aim to offset.
We then suggest a more informed and community embedded implementation of such programmes with the objective to reshape the interactions among the actors of the socio-environmental system toward a more inclusive and environmentally friendly socio-economic development. We argue that articulation with local actors and tailored actions fostering new alliances among community members with clear territorial strategies could be the first way to make these programmes more effective.
We wish that similar forthcoming programmes could capitalise on the lessons learnt in this first programme, and hence fulfill their real potentialities in term of environmentally friendly and socially inclusive rural development of poor communities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: in section 1 we present out theoretical framework used in the rest of the paper, introducing the concept of socio-environmental system, its complex dynamics, and the role played by habits and development pathways in the choices and actions of institutions and households. We also formulate our research questions. In section 2 we introduce a practical framework to analyse and assess microfinance programmes that aim to ecosystems conservation, and we define our methodology to investigate the research questions. In section 3 we very shortly describe the microfinance for ecosystem programme we discuss in the paper: Proyecto CAMBio. In section 4 we presents our data, secondary and primary, and their collection. In section 5 we present our data analysis and results. We finally conclude in section 6. In the appendix we group the description of the institutions implementing the programme.
Theoretical framework
In this section we would like to provide the theoretical framework for our analysis of MF for ecosystems. Our framework is developed starting from a complex system approach to the human-environmental dynamics as presented in (Ramalingam and Jones, 2008; Ambrosio-Albalá and Bastiaensen, 2010) , and underlines the important role played by habits and development pathways in influencing the choices and investments of poor rural populations targeted by PES or MF programmes as discussed in (Hiedanpaa and Bromley, 2014; .
We live in a complex world, however its complexity does not appear such a heavy burden in our daily life: our day-to-day decisions, actions and choices look indeed quite simple. Every day we almost unconsciously perform choices (among which economic choices: what to buy, where to buy it, etc.) that would require a very complex evaluation of a huge number of interlinked benefits and risks. The simplifying assumption of an individual economic actor choosing among the various opportunities to maximise its wealth would imply that everyone would have the capacity and time to spend calculating the potential benefits, loses and risks of its choices among an incalculable number of different possibilities (Hiedanpaa and Bromley, 2014) . If this were true, decisions making and actions would be exceedingly slow and highly inaccurate due to the impossibility for a single actor to grab and understand the complexity of the opportunities opened by every choice. This vision indeed underestimates the role played by habits and beliefs (Hiedanpaa and Bromley, 2014) and development pathways that instead guide and limit our choices. They indeed provide a simplified (even if constrained) framework inside the complex set of benefits and risks open by every potential choice. Habits and development pathways are the social and historical assets that reduce the possibilities of choices to the ones that are socially supported or accepted and or empirically proven (or believed) to be rewarding or less risky.
In the paper, we will mean by habits the influence of past personal, familiar, peers and societal actions, experiences and their outcomes, on the present decisions of a socio-economic actor (households, enterprises, financial intermediaries, etc.) . Something that could be simply phrased as: "...I do it, because I used to do so...", or "... I do it, because it's used to or it is socially accepted...", By development pathways we mean the set of local economic activities inside a community or a region that have proven, or that are believed, to be economically and or socially rewarding and hence influence the livelihoods strategies of households, enterprises, institutions and other actors operating in the same area.
Habits and development pathways support beliefs and rules of actions that are deeply rooted in daily choices, and that, in a circular path, strengthen habits and development pathways themselves. They are emerging properties of the socio-ecological system (SES), in which households live and take decisions. The SES is the outcome of complex relational processes among humans and the environment, mediated by social institutions in particular times and geographical places. It is influenced by and it generates local culture, values, power relations and formal and informal rules. Habits and development pathways emerge as macroscopic results of such complex dynamics. SES is the background inside which people make decisions.
People adapt to habits and local value and, under the constraints and opportunities provided by local and international development pathways, they use them as direct or indirect tools to take decisions. Such background in which people (see economic actors) act is useful because it simplify choices, it builds on past experiences about what works and what does not, reduces risk, links people choices to existing market opportunities and chains, and supports social acceptance of choices and actions. However it also limits people, social and environmental opportunities, because there could exist more rewarding and environmentally friendly choices that are not undertaken because not supported or recognized by present local habits and, or local/international development pathways. The utility and constraints of habits and development pathways are even stronger among population and people that have less economic-social-human-physical capital, that could allow to partially overcome the limitations of a "business as usual behaviour" and develop new decisions and livelihood strategies: poor rural people in developing countries.
As example, we could think to a poor farmer in Nicaragua who practices its rural activities according to what he learnt from his father. Such practices are his main assets and allow him to survive (and sometimes progress) and they reduce his risk. However these livelihood strategies are shaped by a reduced set of local opportunities, uneven power structures, reduced market access, which way too often frequently constrain him in the lowest level of buyers driven value chains and force him into poverty traps. Indeed, old technologies and reduced financial capital often constrain him to cultivate staple crops, or produce for example low quality cacao or milk that do not meet the quality standards required to access better prices: such as sell the cacao to a local cooperative that has access to international organic market; or sell the milk to a local cooperative that has access to national distribution chains or higher prices due to shorter local value chains. Moreover, the geographical location of his farm (due to land market forces), far away from roads, is a physical limitation that prevents him to access to more rewarding markets. At the same time the need for land and the impossibility to buy it cause too expensive, pushes him towards cheaper areas, usually towards the agricultural frontier. The land he sold is often bought by wealthier farmers who use it for profitable activities such as extensive cattle raising (one of the dominant pathways in the region), which is, however, environmentally unsustainable. While the poorer farmers, like him, are forced to move to cheaper and more far-fetched lands, cut trees, burn vegetation, before establishing there. In this way they contribute to environmental degradation and they are even more excluded by actual socio-economic opportunities, while richer farmer cumulate wealth and invest in environmentally destructive practices. Hence the SES sustains and reinforce a socially un-even and environmentally destructive cycle.
It is important to remark that the influences of the complex SES are not limited to individual households but they also refer to institutions, groups, societies (actors in general) who are influenced by habits, beliefs and development pathways in their choices and actions. Indeed, it is reasonable to conclude that it is not really possible to separate a single economic actor (see for example a per-! 4 son or an institution) or a single action from the environment where it lives and acts. The concept of an actor separated by its SES is indeed by itself an abstraction (that could be more or less accurate according to situations), because the action of the SES on the actor strongly influence its choices, while the actions of the individual actors are themselves mediated by SES. Any external intervention is then deemed to interact with the complex socio-economic environmental dynamics of the SES.
The sentences of the famous physicist of last century, Niels Bohr, one of the father of quantum mechanics, are self explanatory and illustrate the interdependency between actors, actions and the environment: "Isolated material particles are abstractions, their properties being definable and observable only through their interaction with other systems." (Bohr, 1934) ; " … one must never forget that in the drama of existence we are ourselves both actors and spectators" (Bohr, 1949) .
Observations or actions in a system or society, or among individual actors and the system itself are not separated and it is not possible to effectively disentangle them. The interactions among the system's constituents, through emerging properties and collective dynamics, form the system itself, which could result and behave very differently compared to a simple sum of individual actors interacting among themselves throughout economic transactions. It is then very important to understand if and when such complex dynamics can be somehow approximated by a simpler system of individual actors, and when instead we should embracing the complexity of the SES to understand the outcomes of actions and decisions.
Indeed any "external" (meaning a new, additional influx of financial, physical or human capital, for example a microfinance programme or development project) intervention will inevitably interact with the SES. The understanding of the SES dynamics and its reaction to the external intervention is fundamental to design the appropriate programme for the stated objectives . Important exam 2 -ples of "external" interventions on the SES that are relevant for the present paper are: MF, PES, and Green MF, which usually -pushed by an economic or over-simplified reductionist vision of the reality -act at individual level inside the SES, through credit provision, monetary incentives, additional non-financial services, etc., implicitly interpreting the SES as a sum of its constituents and without paying enough attention to the local dynamics and interactions among actors, institutions and environment that form the SES.
However, once we accept that in various situations the assumed economic single actor cannot be really distinguished from the SES where it lives and acts, it appears clear that such external intervention actually interacts with the SES itself through its action on a single individual, or a group of individuals. The decision making of such actor(s) would then be shaped, constrained and readdressed by the SES that feedbacks the spectrum of possible choices and opportunities of the actors through its established local habits and development pathways. The actions and decisions of a household, micro-entrepreneur, or an institution, empowered by the external intervention, is then dressed by the interaction with the SES that use to redirect actions and choices towards sound and established habits and pathways, ultimately leading to little or even counterproductive impact of the external intervention. The presence of strong feedbacks in the SES could indeed leads the external intervention to actually have no impact on the SES, even if it manifestly could have positive impact on a single choice/action of the individual actor, or even to support the existent dynamics, and if that sustains socio-economic inequalities or it is environmentally destructive, the external intervention would directly or indirectly support such inequalities and or environmental degradation, even if it aims to fight them. An intervention that would aim to redress the SES toward a socio-economic inclusive environmentally friendly development should probably aim to act at the mechanisms that sustain the existing habits and pathways. The intervention should be addressed not only towards abstract individuals in the system but towards the interactions in the system, supporting alternative actors coalitions, territorial strategies, and articulating with holistic strategies with medium and long term objectives to revert the systems of habits, beliefs and development path-! 5 ! An illustrative example of how differently could react to an external stimulus a complex interacting system compared to 2 the sum of single actors is provided by the well known reaction of a crowd to a sudden shock. In the case of small group of people with quite enough available space, a small external shock does not have too much effect and people use to be able to agree and restart their activities as before the shock; while in the case of a dense crowd even a small external shock could stimulate very dangerous crowd movements and induces dramatic effects. In the second case the individual will, choices, opportunities are lost and the interactions among the various actors sustain new collective emerging dynamics that are however the most relevant for the system itself.
ways that support negative dynamics. Such intervention should probably build on the social ties of the community and on the set of recognized formal and informal norms mediated by people, institutions or environment.
The lack of understanding or consideration of the complexity of the system could threaten the positive outcomes of an otherwise perfectly implemented development programme and it could undermine the objectives themselves of the project. This reasoning could be applied to various sets of external interventions that aim towards poverty reduction, environment conservation, and development programmes in general. Microfinance is an example, and the limited amount of impacts on poverty reduction (Bauchet et.al. 2011 ) could be partially understood in this framework. PES is another example (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002) , and its controversial effects on biodiversity and environment conservation (see for example (Van Hecken, 2011) and reference therein).could be partially understood too in this framework.
In this paper, building on previous analysis and field studies done also by the authors, we would like to apply such theoretical framework to the discussion of green microfinance programmes that aim to ecosystems conservation.
The research questions for this paper is:
• What are the actual potentialities and limitations of green microfinance programmes for ecosystem conservation?
This research question will be supported by the following research sub-question:
• How green microfinance programmes interact with local SES and what are the outcomes of such programmes on SES?
Methodology: a practical framework and its application
To answer the research questions, in this section we develop a practical methodological framework that we will employ in the following sections to study a particular microfinance for ecosystem programme: namely Proyecto CAMBio. We will introduce Proyecto CAMBio in the next section.
A practical framework to assess microfinance for ecosystem conservation
To support with empirical evidence our theoretical analysis, presented in the previous section, and to unveil the outcomes of the complex socio-environmental dynamics of the SES, in this section we propose a practical methodological framework. Building on previous work done in (Forcella, 2012) and applied in field studies by (Forcella, 2012; Lucheschi, 2014) , we propose a framework that should be able to translate the conceptual approach to MF and ecosystems into a practical methodology to assess green MF programmes. We will then apply it to a specific MF for ecosystem conservation programme to expose some of the complex dynamics of the SES and in particular the influence of habits and development pathways on choices and actions of households targeted by the programmes and of finical intermediary institutions delivering the programme.
The practical methodological framework we propose has two main objectives:
1. at theory level: to provide a tool able to assess and illustrate the divergences and synergies between an individual actor perspective and the complex SES dynamics. In particular, it aims to underly how the actual outcomes of a green MF programme for ecosystems conservation are influenced by the SES and cannot be simply reduced to a linear economic model.
2.
at practical level: to provide a practical methodological tool that could be useful to other people and institutions willing to assess or design MF for ecosystems programmes, and more in general green MF programmes, and unveil their actual or potential outcomes.
!
The practical methodological framework we propose is built on a two-steps analysis:
A) Operational: assessment of the actual implementation of the programme done by the MFI, or other intermediary institutions, according to the rules and indicators of the programme itself;
! 6 B) Outcomes: assessment of the actual socio-environmental outcomes of the programme on the SES, according to a five steps analysis: targeting, additionality, sustainability, externalities, governance.
The first part: "operational", aims at assessing if the programme could be or is actually correctly implemented by the intermediary institutions (e.g. MFIs) and households, according to the indicators and parameters provided by the programme itself, without questioning its possible intrinsic limitations.
The second part: "outcomes" aims instead at assessing to what extent such programmes are actually able to tackle environmental degradation, and how do they interact with local socio-economic and environmental dynamics. The second part is built on the framework of institutional ecological economics and complexity theory for socio-ecological systems as presented in the previous section.
The comparison between the results of the assessment done in part A and part B aims to provide a view on the difference between a simple linear -individual dynamics and the complex SES dynamics. Namely it assess how MF for ecosystems (e.g. focused on individual actors), interacts with local development pathways, and how this interaction can induce feedbacks that could redirect the overall outcome of the project aligning it with local habits and development pathways or instead revert them towards new (environmentally friendly) pathways. At a practical level positive results in part A and no relevant difference between results in A and B would imply that the actual programme is well designed to tackle the SES dynamics, while important differences between results in A and B would imply instead that the programme is not able to deal with complex socio-economic and environmental dynamics and the environmental results in A (positive or negative) cannot help to infer the actual socio-environmental results of the programme.
To apply the practical methodology it could be useful to picture the SES as composed by a microscopic part: the actions and choices directly influenced by the programme; and a macroscopic part, not directly influenced or targeted by the programme. The two part of the SES are clearly in interaction and the strength of this interaction defines the outcomes of the programme. The strength of such interaction measure somehow the influence of habits and development pathways on the decisions of individual actors. See Figure 1 . Both the micro and the macro parts of the system should not be simply though in spatial terms, but instead as multidimensional ensembles. The microscopic part could be thought as the households participating to the project, the part of their land that is targeted by the programme, the required time for the investment financed by the programme, the set of institutions that actually implement the programme, and all that aspect that are directly influenced by the programme itself. The macroscopic part should instead be thought as a multidimensional socio-economic space involving the medium-long term evolution of the changes done in the microscopic part, the households' land outside the committed area, the area outside the households' properties, the households' and communities' culture and socio-economic constraint, livelihood strategies and development pathways, the behaviour of the institutions regarding the environment and all those aspects that participate to the constitution of the SES but that are not directly targeted by the programme. The positive environment impacts of a MF programme for ecosystems conservation should clearly imply the production of positive outcomes on the macroscopic structure (i.e. the ecosystem and the SES). However a MF programme naturally acts on the microscopic structure. To assure that the action of the MF programme has the potentialities to induce positive outcomes on the macroscopic structure, the programme should be able to act on (some of) the interactions between the microscopic and the macroscopic structure. A careful action should be able to redirect the existing interactions, shaped by habits and local development pathways, toward the establishment of new habits and livelihood strategies that are more socio-economic inclusive and environmentally friendly.
We can further detailed the five dimensions of part B and what are the main aspects that they are supposed to assess for every dimensions:
i) Targeting: assessment of the target clients, activities and financial intermediaries and their relation with local socio-economic inequalities and environmental degradation;
ii) Additionality: analysis of the activities implemented (and financed or rewarded) by the households and institutions due to the programme compared to their previous activities;
iii) Sustainability: analysis of the potentialities of the programme to induce medium-long term environmentally friendly changes in the SES; iv) Externalities : study of the outcomes of the programme on activities, assets or people that 4 are not directly targeted by the programme itself, but that are instead influenced as indirect consequence of the programme.
v)
Governance: analysis of the synergies and trade-offs among the objectives and incentives of the various actors involved in the programme, and their interaction with the actors that do not participate to the programme, but support an enabling or constraining environment.
Targeting the right clients is very important because some of the individual actors in the SES, due to their roles and status, are more or less intrinsically oriented toward a destructive or protecting environmental pathway . Hence, an external intervention targeting the right players with the suit 5 -able product will be more luckily to redirect existing habits and pathways instead of indirectly support environmentally destructive and socio-economically unequal dynamics. The same discussion applies also to institutions that, due to their mission, history, relationships with clients, etc. could 6 ! 8 ! It is important to stress that this distinction between part A and par B of the assessment, and the micro and macrosco 3 -pic part of the SES, is somehow artificial and it is done here for explanatory reasons. Indeed if the influence of habits and pathways is very strong the effect of the complexity of the SES will be directly seen also in the microscopic part and in part A, as it could strongly influence the decisions on how to implement the programme both for intermediary institutions and clients. This option will indeed appear clear in the case of Guatemala presented below.
! Please observe that in the rest of the paper we use the concept of externalities with this meaning and not the usual 4 used in standard economic literature: costs or benefits that are not rewarded in monetary price terms. We hope that this abuse of language will not confuse the reader.
! Think for example to small rural farmers that, due to land and financial constraints, are forced to intensify their produc 5 -tion planting at the same time cacao, coffee, fruits trees, compared to large cattle raisers that instead do not have any intrinsic incentive to intensify their production and find more profitable to pursue the environmentally disruptive path of extensive cattle raising. be more or less likely to target certain types of farmers, or to apply specific procedures and actions.
The additionality of a green MF programme is important for at least three different reasons: the use of subsidies (usually present in such programmes and in the case we consider in the following in the form of PES), the environment, and the economic conditions of the households participating to the program. The good allocation of subsidies implies that the programme should prioritise subsidies for activities that are not normally done by the households, and the subsidies should be in some sense proportional to the cost of the additional activities or the price of the additional environmental services provided by these activities. Additionality should imply a positive impact on the economic conditions of the producers thanks to the induced diversification of its production and the additional human and physical capital acquired with the new activity. A certain degree to additionality of the program should also have a positive impact on the environment, thanks to the additional environmentally friendly activity implemented. Additionality should be intended not only as additional activities, but also as better quality or amount of previous activities, faster implementation of already established plans, etc.
Sustainability is the dimension that should take into account the medium-long term outcomes related to the environmental changes and the eventual scarcity of subsidies. Namely the changes induced in the households' production or in the institutions' procedures should be economically sustainable in the medium and long term, induce a positive change in the habits related to the environment, and the new environmental services provided should be preserved and integrated in the development strategy of the households, or the procedures of the institutions implementing the programme.
In the framework we presented additionality and sustainability of a programme as two separate concepts, however it is reasonable that there exists a correlation between the two. Indeed a high sustainability could be partially caused by a low additionality: namely if the changes induced by the programme are not too important it will be easier for the households or the implementing institutions to preserve and reproduce these changes. This potential correlation between additionality and sustainability should be taken into account in the analysis.
The presence of positive environmental externalities and the reduction of the negative ones is of fundamental importance for a green MF programmes that aim at ecosystem conservation, if they want to really have a positive impact on the environment. The programme influences directly only the microstructure but it should have the aim to bring relevant changes to the macroscopic structure as well: the environment and the biodiversity, as well the socio-economic causes of environmental destructive pathways. It is fundamental to understand what is happening beyond the specific activity financed by the MF programme: is the programme really influencing a change in the overall activities of the clients towards a more environmentally friendly production? Or is the product directly or indirectly financing environmentally dangerous activities beyond the activity directly supported by the programme? Are the environmentally friendly activities stimulated by the green MF programme inducing positive changes also in the production or choices of other households or institutions that do not have access to the programme? Such analysis of externalities should carefully consider also the effect of the programme on poverty reduction and socio-economic inequalities and their impacts on the environment. Socio-economic inequalities and environmental degradation are often correlated concept and it is important to analyse the ability of the program to take advantage of this correlation to maximize its positive environmental outcomes.
Governance is of major importance for MF programmes for ecosystem conservation due to the presence or need of various different actors for the implementation of the programme: the households, the MFIs, the organization providing the environmental subsidies, the organization providing the possible technical training, the local institutions and organizations with their environmental policy, etc. All these actors could and usually have different objectives and motivation to implement the programme. It is important to assess that all the actors are working directly or indirectly to reach the same objectives, and that the programme try to stimulate synergies and reduce potential tradeoffs among the various actors, to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of the programme.
Application of the methodological framework
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To try to answer to our research questions we apply the methodological practical framework introduced in the previous subsection to an actual microfinance programme for ecosystem conservation developed in Central America in the period 2007-2013: Proyecto CAMBio (see next section). We believe that the choice of the programme is very appropriate, because it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first large-scale microfinance for ecosystem programme that has been implemented.
We decided to analyse in detail the implementation of such programmes for two specific cases: one in Nicaragua and one in Guatemala. A full evaluation of the programme would have required long term investigation in the field and in depth interviews, which were not possible with the limited resources by the authors. Nevertheless we belie that the two case studies selected offer a comprehensive picture of the programme due to their complementarity (see below) and because they are quite representative in term of number of clients and amount of subsidies for the full Proyecto CAMBio. This is particularly for the micro-enterprises/poor households target that is of main interest for our investigation, while instead our analysis cannot pretend to be representative of the small and medium enterprises sector that was also targeted by the programme.
We decided to apply the methodological framework presented above to a unique set of secondary and primary data collected by the authors (see below), and to employ a mix of qualitative and quantitative data analysis. The use at the same time of secondary, primary, qualitative and quantitative data analysis has the aim: i) to complement the broad, general picture of the secondary data with local, in-depth pictures from the primary data that could underline subtle information not visible from the secondary data; ii) to strengthen the results using quantitative data analysis and use the qualitative data to contextualized the results and expose hidden information.
!
It is probably important to remark that the practical methodological framework we propose is thought as a logical map and not a set of indicators to be filled. It is has a flexible but definite structure, which can be applied across countries (as in this paper) or across programmes. It allows an in-depth analysis of the single case while providing a common ground for comparisons with other cases analysed with the same framework. In other words, it permits both in absolute terms (i.e. respective the specific baseline) or relative terms (i.e. with respect of the other case). The application of the framework on the two case studies in this paper will highlight differences and similarities and the reasons behind them.
The Context
In this section we very briefly provide the context of our investigation: Proyecto CAMBio in Central America. In the section data analysis we will go much more in depth with the description of the actual dynamics and programme implementation done in Nicaragua and Guatemala by the institutions we investigate.
In Central America, agricultural activities cover 40% of the land area, employ 57% of the regional labour force and are an important component of the GDP. However present agricultural land use, has negative environmental impacts such as loss of biodiversity, land degradation, deforestation, water contamination.
Proyecto CAMBio
Proyecto CAMBio (PCAMBio, UMMPost, 2014) is the first large scale programme that incorporates MF, TA, PES, and partial guaranty, trying to foster biodiversity conservation and environmentally friendly land-use practices. It provides micro-credits to finance (among others) agroforestry and silvopastoral activities such as coffee, cardamom, cacao, and cattle raising that integrate trees into the rural production. The PES-component, called Bio Award (or Bio Premio in Spanish), seeks to reward the additional efforts towards adopting biodiversity-friendly practices such as planting more trees; and TA is provided to rural producers to support and monitor the implementation of the financed activities. The partial guaranty is intended to reduce the (perceived) risk for financial intermediaries to engage in such new programme. The programme ran from 2007 till 2013 in five countries in Central America: Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica. It was lead by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), that provided the line of credit to in-! 10 termediate financial institutions (FIs) in the various countries; the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), that provided the grant to reward the implementation of environmentally friendly practices and to finance the technical assistance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), that administrated the programme and provided technical assistance on matters related to biodiversity. The programme was implemented by 26 local financial institutions (FIs) and NGOs.
The CABEI provides to FIs the line of credit, while the GEF provides a potential 30% subsidy for every successful loan distributes: 10% as a payment to the institution providing the TA to the producers, 14% to the producers that succeed after one year to fulfil all the agreed environmental indicators as an incentive for the environmental investment (PES, the Bio Award) and a 6% to the FI for every successful client. Moreover a guaranty can be used by the FIs to reduce their credit risk and push them to lend for more innovative and environmentally friendly investments.
Claimed outcomes at the end of the programme are: around 25,000 farmers and MSMEs financed for investment in sustainable rural practices for a total of around 52 millions USD; technical assistance services for around 2.08 million USD to around 24,000 households and SMEs; and 1.4 million dollars in environmental award to around 4,000 farmers.
Data collection
As explained in the methodology section, we decided to focus our attention on Proyecto CAMBio as implemented in Nicaragua and Guatemala. In Nicaragua, Proyecto CAMBio was implemented by four institutions: Lase-Bancentro, Fundeser, Coop 20 Abril and FDL. In Guatemala six institutions were involved: AYNLA, ADICLA, ASDIR, Banco de Desarrollo Rural, S.A., Fondesol, Fundación Technológica Génesis Empresarial. The total amount of credit disbursed was 6,040,000 USD in Nicaragua and 9,940,000 USD in Guatemala at December 2012. We focus our attention on the implementation done by FDL (in partnership with Nitlapan for the TA) in Nicaragua, and by Gé-nesis in Guatemala (see the Appedix for more details on these institutions).
For our analysis we exploit a unique set of primary and secondary data collected by the two authors in the period of June-August 2012 in Nicaragua and in the period May-August 2014 in Guatemala (Lucheschi; .
The secondary data consist of internal reports and assessments by the two MFIs and their databases concerning the clients that participated to the programme. In particular for FDL and Nitlapan in Nicaragua we have access to the detailed information for the first 838 contracts. In Nicaragua the primary data comes from semi-structured interviews to 55 FDL's clients that participated to Proyecto CAMBio in two different geographical and socio-economic areas, 5 rural producers that were clients of FDL but did not participate to Proyecto CAMBio, 6 producers with similar socioeconomic characteristics, but that were not clients of FDL, 9 staff members of FDL and Nitlapan part of the management team, and 7 loan officers and technicians. Moreover interviews to representatives of CABEI and local institutions (cooperatives and municipalities) were realised too. In Guatemala the sources of secondary data are detailed information from Génesis concerning 2,233 contracts that were selected for the verification related to the environmental award and 3,616 contracts that received technical assistance. Primary data are interviews to 64 Génesis' clients beneficiaries of Proyecto CAMBio, 10 staff members at management and administrative levels, 6 loan officers and 10 trainers. In total, concerning the secondary data, we have access to some thousands contracts, while for the primary data we have 84 respondents in Nicaragua, and 90 respondents in Guatemala, reaching a total of 174 interviews.
Our sources of primary data are grouped in Table 1 for Nicaragua and in Table 2 for Guatemala . In 7 particular we provide some details for the various regions of investigations: in Nicaragua: the Central Region: Matiguas and Rio Blanco, and the Northern region composed by farmers grouped around three areas: La Dalia, San Jose Bocay, Pantasma; in Guatemala the regions of: Alta Verapaz, Izabal, Petén.
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! Unfortunately the data set for the two case studies are not completely homogeneous as it can be seen in Table 1 and   7   Table 2 .
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Here below we provide the details for the data and data collections, specific for Guatemala and Nicaragua. Table 1 : Some details concerning the primary data we use for Nicaragua. The Northern Group is composed of producers from the areas of La Dalia (7), San Jose Bocay (9), Pantasma (6). SSP: credits for silvopasture activities; SAF: credits for agroforestry activities. Invested area: is the amount of land dedicated to the activity funded with Proyecto CAMBio. 
!
Number Contracts
Guatemala
In the case of Guatemala secondary data were collected from the CABEI (general information on the programme) and Génesis, which provided reports on the technical assistance and portfolio figures. At the time of the research, Génesis had not carried out any assessment on Proyecto CAMBio. The complete portfolio database did not present full details on the contracts; but only a summary of the data (total amount and number of clients grouped per branch). Nevertheless, it was possible to obtain the complete database on contracts of clients pre-selected for the Bio Award and the complete database of contracts of clients who participated to the TA. There were no data on the environmental indicators, meaning it was not possible to know which indicators was linked to a specific contract, not even for the beneficiaries interviewed in the sample.
Primary data consist in semi-structured interviews with 64 beneficiaries and 26 staff members of the MFI. The selection of the clients was carried out with the MFI according to the following criteria: in first place, the client had to have participated to at least two components (credit + TA and/or Bio Award), which also lead the selection of the regions of the investigation; secondly, only clients who could be reached within the day from the local branch were considered. There is a significant bias towards the women due to two main reasons: firstly women are usually easier to find, as they tend to stay in the village while the men work in the field; secondly, the majority of clients in Génesis are indeed women, even though that was not the case in Proyecto CAMBio. Because the Servicio Desarrollo Empresarial (SDE) department was the point of reference during the research and works above all with women, the MFI tended to propose and know better the location of this group of clients. The large majority of the beneficiaries belonged to the Q'echi' community and spoke only the local language. A member of Génesis, most of the time a trainer of the SEDE, was therefore translating from Spanish to Q'echi' and vice-versa: interviews are thus influenced by both the translation and the presence of a member of the MFI. They took place at the house of the producer and lasted between 20 and 60 minutes. The questionnaire was based on the one previously developed for Nicaragua (Forcella, 2012) , where the implementation strategy was eventually very different. It was re-adapted on the field according to the implementation specificities.
The primary data related to the beneficiaries were collected during six weeks of field research, spending two weeks in the Petén department (branches of San Luis and Raxruhà), two weeks in Izabal (branches of Rio Dulce and El Estor) and two weeks in Alta Verapaz (branches of Cobàn and San Pedro Carchà) see Figure 2 . Nevertheless, the administrative divisions of Génesis do not correspond to the geographic department: Raxruhà is located in Alta Verapaz, Rio Dulce serves mainly clients located in Alta Verapaz. Eventually, 48 clients were geographically situated in Alta Verapaz, 13 in Izabal and 3 in the Petén. For the analysis, clients were assigned to the their branch, presenting the final numbers shown in the table. The Progress Out of Poverty Index Survey was conducted on every interviewee. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with three managers (gerentes); one director (i.e. vice-manager); two assistants to the credit department (one considered to be the person in charge of Proyecto CAMBio); two regional director of the SDE; two regional directors of the credit department; six loan officers; ten trainers. 
Nicaragua
In this subsection we would like to provide some additional data concerning the data for Nicaragua.
The sources of secondary data are data collected from the CABEI, FDL and Nitlapan. From the CABEI we collected information related to the main characteristics of the Proyecto CAMBio as concerning activities financed, rules of the programme, the fund provided by the CABEI to FDL, and the structure of the various subsidies. From FDL we obtained the relevant information concerning the portfolio of Proyecto CAMBio at 31st May 2012: names of the clients, credit amount per every client, term of the credits, structure of repayment, outstanding balance in arrears, the annual declining interest rate, the cost of commissions, the credit policy etc. From Nitlapan we collected all the data concerning the environmental indicators used, the activities the various producers decided to implement, the estimated cost for every activity, the structure of the farms, the documents reporting the visits and the technical assistance of the Nitlapan staff members to the rural producers, the progresses done by the producers to achieve the completion of all the environmental indicators and receive the Bio Premio. Moreover we collected the various reports and working papers drawn by Nitlapan and describing and analysing the implementation of the programme, and the database for some of the macroscopic indicators for the first 838 producers: area designated to implement the activity financed by Proyecto CAMBio, the cost of the trees, the actual number of trees planted, etc.
We value the secondary sources of data on average very trustable. When some incoherencies appeared among comparable sources of data, such as the ones from Nitlapan and the ones from FDL, or inside a single document, the specific contract affected was excluded from the data analysis. One of the most important secondary data we use to understand the role of the SES on the choices and actions implemented by the clients of Proyecto CAMBio is the cost, computed by Nitlapan, for the various activities that the producers are supposed to realize with the green credit he/ she received. These documents carefully report the complete cost required to implement activities such as: planting one hectare of improved pasture with shadow trees, planting one hectare of cacao or coffee with shadow trees, construct living fences, etc. The cost we used is the cost for the establishment of the economic activity, and not of the full cost required to bring the plantation till the productive stage. This is indeed the part of the activity that FDL and Nitlapan claim to finance. The cost computed by Nitlapan includes the labor, at the local market prices, and the cost of every ! 14 material that the client is supposed to purchase to realize the activity. The computation of these costs was done by staff members of Nitlapan working in the field in cooperation with the rural producers. This exercise was done in the area of La Dalia, but before applying it to other regions, we worked with the staff members of Nitlapan in Managua, and in the region of Matiguas and Rio Blanco, to adapt the cost structure to the local situation.
The source of primary data were collected throughout interviews with various actors of the Proyecto CAMBio and they are reported in the previous section and in Table 1 . The primary data are collected through one to one interviews with clients, loan officers, managers, etc. and they are related to two main regions with difference socio-economic dynamics and development pathways : 8
• 33 detailed interviews of approximately one hour and a half each, in the central region of Nicaragua, and in particular in the area of Rio Blanco and Matiguas (see Figure 3 ). This region is historically dominated by extensive cattle raising pathways, that is one of the most profitable activity, but at the same time environmentally destructive. All the interviews were implemented by one of the author in the house or the farm of the clients without the presence of any staff member form FDL or Nitlapan. The great majority of the clients in the sample received the credit between 2009 and 2010, completed the agreed activity and has already received the Bio Premio.
• 22 short interviews of around fifteen minutes each to clients of FDL that participated to Proyecto CAMBio and reside in the Northern region of Nicaragua near the natural reserve of Penas Blancas. This region is historically dominated by the coffee plantation pathways. The interviews were done by one of the author during three public events for the distribution of the Bio Premio in the location of La Dalia, San Jose Bocay, and Pantasma (see Figure 3) . The great majority of the producers in the sample received the credit between 2010 and 2011, completed the agreed activity, and they received the Bio Premio the day of the interview.
We consider the primary data collected in the central region of Nicaragua as very reliable due to the conditions, location and presence of various consistency checks and questions. The interviews in Matiguas moreover were able to provide exact information concerning the cash flow and the details of the invested activities for a big part of the producers. When an inconsistency inside the quantitative data analysis is encountered the specific indicator affected was not considered in the analysis. The primary data from the Northern region have a series of weakness: the reduced time devoted to the interview, the potential bias in the answer of the clients due to the presence of other clients and staff members of institutions. However we consider the overall quality of these primary data as quite good. Indeed its analysis confirms the trend observed in the other group of interview, even if obtained from an independent sample. Moreover that the existence of the above-mentioned constraints should induce the clients to hide some of the information that instead are revealed in the interviews, especially in relation with the externalities. The Table 1 shows that the sample is quite representative of the population, even if some bias are underlined. Some bias could be related to the selection of clients: proximity and possibility to reach them was included as one of the criteria for clients' selection.
The choice of these two regions is due to their complementarity, indeed as explained more in detail in the following in the Central region extensive cattle raising is the dominant pathways, while in the Northern region the coffee plantation is the dominant pathways. Assessing the interaction of a MF project for ecosystem services with such two different dominant pathways, should then strength our analysis showing that independently of the particular pathways the SES interacts with the possibilities and choices induced by the external intervention and it redirects the outcomes towards dominant pathways, indirectly sustaining the pre-existing dynamics.
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! The actual text of the questionnaires can be found in (Forcella, 2012) . 
Data analysis and results
In this section we present the analysis of the secondary and primary data for Guatemala first and then for Nicaragua. The analysis of the two case studies is done independently one from the other, but both cases are analysed with the methodological framework described in section 2.
The analysis proceed in the following way: first we provide a description of the socio-economic, environmental and microfinance trend in the country and region of investigation (the SES), then we introduce the action of Proyecto CAMBio on such SES, and we analyse it according to the two steps framework: A) operational level -B) outcomes level (target, additionality, sustainability, externality, governance). We end with a conclusion for both cases.
The choice of Guatemala and Nicaragua and in particular of the action of Génesis and the partnership FDL-Nitlapan to assess the interaction of the Proyecto CAMBio with local SES and its dynamics is relevant for the following reasons:
• The two cases are pretty complementary: FDL deals with individual loans of relatively large amount (2019 USD) and works in partnerships with Nitlapan that provides the TA; while Génesis works mainly with group loans of relatively small amount (502 USD) and it interiorises the provision of TA inside one of its department.
• outcomes from a mix study of FDL and Génesis could be somehow claimed to be representative of the outcomes of the Proyecto CAMBio. Indeed, even if it is not clear if they could be representative of the full set of implementations, FDL was the institution disbursing a great portion of environmental rewards (291,373 USD at December 2012, corresponding to the 32% of all the environmental rewards for the full Proyecto CAMBio), while Génesis disbursed a great part of the credits (9,529 corresponding to the 38% of the total number of credit disbursed).
In our analysis here below we want to assess the influence of the SES on the implementation and outcomes of Proyecto CAMBio both at clients and MFI level. Indeed as presented in the theoretical part we see clients and institutions are actors embedded in the SES and throughout their choices and actions, shaped by the local habits and dynamics, they influence the outcomes of the programme.
The choice of order of presentation: Guatemala first and Nicaragua afterward, is done for pedagogical reasons. Indeed, even if the data collection for the first case was done two years after the second one, and the methodology employed comes from the one developed for Nicaragua, the practical framework we propose naturally privilege this order. Indeed part A of the practical framework will already show some of the influence of habits on the choices of the MFI on how to imple-! 16 ment the programme. While in the case number two part A of our framework will simply confirm that the programme has been implemented as defined by the ones that designed Proyecto CAMBio, while part B will instead points out the strong influence of habits and development pathways on the actual outcomes of the programme on the SES.
The fact that our practical framework is able to underline effects of habits also in its operational part, somehow quite differently from what stated in the general theoretical picture, show the flexibility of the framework and its ability to adapt to not foreseen circumstances, as explained in a footnote in section 2.
The case of Guatemala will clearly show the influence of habits and development pathways first on the choices and actions of the intermediary institution, and secondly on the clients; while the case of Nicaragua will clearly show the influence of habits and development pathways first on the choices and actions of the clients, and secondly on the intermediary institution.
Of course this picture is oversimplified but we feel that it provide a useful explanation.
Indeed the influence of the SES on the clients is definitively also induced by the choices of the MFI on how to implement the programme and to whom and why offer the product, while the actions of the MFI is clearly influenced also by the opportunities and constraints provided by its clients. In Guatemala and in Nicaragua it will be clear how the SES has strongly influenced both clients and intermediary institutions.
However this simplification seems to us to provide an interesting narrative.
Case 1 -Guatemala Génesis
In this section we analyse our first case study: the implementation of Proyecto CAMBio as done by Génesis in Guatemala. We first present the SES, and we then analysis the interaction of Proyecto CAMBio with such dynamics.
The SES
Socio-economy at country level
Guatemala represents the largest economy in Central America, but also one of the countries with the highest levels of inequality in Latin America: its Gini coefficient correspond to 52 (2011), lower only to those of Honduras (57, 2011) and Brasil and Paraguay (53, 2011) . It also ranks last in Central America according to the Human Development Index and 133 among 187 in the world. World Bank (2009) identifies the major obstacles to the country's development with very low tax revenues and public expenditure and a lack of infrastructures and human capital. A significant part of the economy remains informal.
Today's situation is the result of historical and cultural factors and in particular of long-lasting exclusionary practices toward the Mayan population, which began with the Spanish conquest and continued along the centuries. Indigenous populations have been excluded politically, socially and economically, including through the expropriation of their land and their conversion in labor-force. During the thirty-six years long civil war that ended in 1996, thousands of Mayans (allegedly between 200.000 and 250.000) were killed or "disappeared", seriously altering the social fabric of the country. In the last 20 years moderate poverty has been improving, but extreme poverty -which is highly concentrated in rural areas and among indigenous peoples -has not. In particular, poverty in Guatemala is concentrated in the so-called "poverty belt", which covers the western plateau and the northern region and is mainly inhabited by rural indigenous producers who live out of subsistence agriculture. This situation is complicated by Guatemala's complex topography and poor infrastructures, which has kept rural communities isolated, facilitating the exclusion and negligence. Part of the peace accords foreseen the reallocation of land via a national long-term credit programme, which has reached only a small part of the intended beneficiaries. According to a national survey of 2001 (URL, Instituto de Incidencia Ambiental, 2006), small land holders (corresponding to 549,000 microfincas, size <0.7ha) represent only the 3.6% of Guatemala's territory, while largest land-holders (corresponding to 16,000 fincas multifamiliares, size >45 ha) account for the 62% of the territory.
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Environmental trends
Deforestation is Guatemala's primary environmental concern: according to the National Institute for the forests, between 1950 and 2002 the country lost half its forest cover and has been losing the 1% annually between 2006 (INAB, 2012 .
Historically, the Pacific plains were cleared to make room for sugarcane and coffee plantations, while the Caribbean coasts are today covered in banana plantations. The highlands still host mainly subsistence agriculture, but African palm and sugarcane, usually owned by foreign investors linked to powerful local elites, have began to spread. The Petén department is the largest and dominates the whole northern part of the country: until recently, it was barely inhabited and densely covered in forests. In the last years it experienced the greater loss in forests due to its colonization, which was encouraged by the government to release the population pressure for land. While a significant part of the department is now under protection, the pressure is still high and illegal appropriation, especially linked to drug traffic, is a serious threat. Data from the 2006 -2010 (INAB, 2012 confirmed that the Petén department is by far the area with the largest net loss (124,215 ha), but this is also due its huge size compared to the other departments: indeed, at the percentage annual loss, Petén is in fourth place (2.08%).
Fire is yet another cause of deforestation, whether started on purpose or result of mismanagement of the slash-and-burn technique practised in subsistence agriculture. Deforestation has affected the rainfall, altering the weather and related agricultural patterns, affecting especially less skilled farmers who face more difficulties to adjust to changing seasons.
Other environmental concerns include high level of pollution, comprising water and air quality: a significant part of the population (a quarter at country level, up to 50% in rural areas) lack access to safe drinking water and related basic services. The main causes are the poor management of garbage, the massive use of chemical fertilizer and the presence of industries.
The microfinance sector
According to the Economist microscope, in Guatemala "Microfinance remains weakly regulated, with an overly broad definition of micro-credit and the absence of specialised rules and methods in such areas as risk evaluation, provisioning and portfolio classification" and indeed the country scores last in Central America. In the last two years, the competition has increased, as it can be seen at glance by the gross loan portfolio of the first four institutions reported in the Mix Market (in millions USD): Fundación Génesis Empresarial (84 in 2011 , 94 in 2012 and 89 in 2013 ), Fundea (25 in 2011 , 30 in 2012 and 30 in 2013 ), Fondesol (13 in 2011 , 17 in 2012 and 22 in 2013 and Compartamos (3 in 2011 Compartamos (3 in , 8 in 2012 Compartamos (3 in and 14 in 2013 . Another important competitor is Banco Azteca, the financial branch of the Elektra. The high demand, the increased number of institutions and the weak regulation (including the absence of sound credit bureaus) increased the probabilities of the spread of overindebtedness, worsened by the agricultural prices crisis (including cardamom and coffee). Indicators of portfolio quality (portfolio at risk thirty and ninety days (PAR30 and PAR90), write-offs) increased for all the institutions in the same period (PAR 30 from an average of 2,6% to 3,9%; PAR90 from an average of 1,63% to 2,53% and write-offs from 2,1% to 4,8%).
Guatemala is among the largest producers and exporters of cardamom in the world and many rural producers entirely rely on this product, which is the most profitable cash crop in the country with coffee. Because of over-production and poor quality, prices plummeted to one-fifth, leaving microfinances clients with no income to repay their multiple debts.
Development pathways and socio-ecological systems in the region analysed
While data were collected spending two weeks in every selected department (Petén, Izabal, Alta Verapaz), geographically 48 clients from the sample resided in Alta Verapaz and 11 (out of 13) of those situated in Izabal very close to the departmental border. For this reason, this section presents the local dynamics of Alta Verapaz.
The department of Alta Verapaz is the poorest department in Guatemala: 78% of the population is poor, of which 37.5% lives in extreme poverty (Banco de Guatemala, 2013; Instituto Nacional de ! 18
Estadistica, 2011) . Indigenous people compose around 90% of its population. The department 9 presents the highest number of requests for land to the national programme aforementioned, together with other department of the poverty belt (such as Quiché, Quetzaltenango and San Marcos), suggesting a direct relation to the historic exclusionary policy and the ongoing land accumulation by large landowners. As often the case in Guatemala, farming is challenging due to the department topography, which requires cultivating on steep slopes with few water sources. Besides, tropical forest soil is not rich in nutrients.
Most micro producers engage in subsistence agriculture (mainly milpa, maize and beans), characterized by low productivity, poor technique (including slash-and-burn) and overexploitation of the soil, which eventually becomes unproductive. Considering the limited size of their plot and the volatility of the market prices, they are constantly exposed to risk. Cash crops such as coffee and cardamom are common: both plants require at least three years to start producing, which means there is need for a long-term investment to launch a new plantation. As a matter of fact, the poorest people can't afford to dedicate a part of their plot to an unproductive crop for three years without rewarding. Knowledge on the maintenance of these crops varies among the producers, with the most skilled being former workers in large fincas. Usually productivity is rather low compared to the potentialities of the crops: according to a study conducted by CRECER (2014), one hectare of coffee can produce about 280-350qq coffee cherries per year, while in 2012-2013 rural producers in Alta Verapaz produced only 103qq/ha -about one third, with glooming forecasting due the spread of the roya plague. As cardamom requires less maintenance than other crop, there exist a popular belief that it can grow wild without any maintenance, which in part explains the spread of the thrips, the plague currently affecting its production and drastically lowering the prices. Following local habits, microproducers only take care of the plants when prices are high and neglect them when prices are low, overall affecting the quality.
Hence, both producers who have and have not cash crops are often limited in their production potentiality for lack of human and financial capital and are forced to limited choices (traditional crops, traditional techniques, etc.) shaped by the SES. The situation is worsened by the isolation of many communities related to the topography and lack of infrastructures, which complicate the provision of both. Microproducers are not organized in any form (e.g. cooperatives), do not have access to technical assistance and are not linked to a favourable value chain, which induce them to sell their product at a very low price to local intermediaries. For example, cardamom cherries need to be dried within 24-48 hours from the harvest, otherwise their quality can be compromised: buyers and intermediaries exploit the pressing necessity of poor producers, who do not own the specific machines to dry the product. The mechanism is alike for coffee. Poor rural people, strongly influence by their SES, struggle to see alternatives to their traditional activities and in the way to conduct them; additionally, as a result of a typical short-time perspective characteristic of the poor, they might make poor strategic decisions, such as selling their productive assets (in primis land) to purchase consumer goods or other non productive assets. The most probable buyers are either the large landowners (especially where sugarcane and African palm are expanding) or local entrepreneurs with longer-term perspectives. Poor people, whose education level is often extremely low, might also lose their land because incapable of completing the registration process. Indeed, as property rights and legislation are still blurry in many rural areas, in order to obtain an official document (often asked by many MFIs as collateral) it is necessary to go through several administrative procedures, which also require a moderate expense. Would arise any question on the property of piece of land, the one with paper would prevail.
At forestry level, Alta Verapaz showed a net increase in the period 2006-2010, with significant variations at municipio's level. The relative losses in the eastern municipios of the Alta Verapaz are among the highest values (between 9 and 16%) in the country, while the same happens western area looking at the gross loss (between 10,000 and 25,000 ha). Nevertheless, the department shows as well a relative (between 3 and 18 %) and gross (between 500 and 16,000 ha) gain, especially in the western areas, which explain the net gain at departmental level. There are no data on the factors behind these variations, but it is very likely related to the advancing of the agricultural frontier on the loss side and to the plantation of rubber trees and national program for forestry ! 19
! Extreme poverty line is set according to the cost of purchasing enough food to comply with the annual calorie needs of incentives on gain side. More challenging is to identify who is behind these changes: on the one hand, smaller and poorer producers own land parcels too small to justify the dimension of these alterations; on the other hand, cultivation of palm oil and sugarcane are spreading in the areas. African palm, whose introduction at industry level in the country is rather recent, has been under the spots, as it happened before to sugarcane and banana plantations. On one corner, owners claim that these cultivations creates jobs, bringing welfare to the poor, and that they reforested former grazing land; on the other, some stakeholders (especially NGOs, such Oxfam -see "The power of oil pam", 2013) underlined the poor working conditions as well as the loss of lands for many small owners, who are directly or indirectly forced to sell. They also argue that large parts of the forest were cleared for new plantation: besides, African palm requires much water, draining the terrain and leaving it uncultivable.
Once again, there seems to be a link between inequalities and environmental large landholders accumulate land and exploit the soil and work force, following old exclusion patterns; poor producers tend to lose their productive assets more or less consciously, and/or continued to be limited in their productivity, while endangering the environment and the biodiversity using traditional techniques.
The interactions of Proyecto CAMBio with the SES
In this section we analyse the interaction between the Proyecto CAMBio and the previously described SES. The analysis is done following the two steps methodological framework of section 2.
Operational assessment
Génesis Empresarial was the largest intermediary in Guatemala in Proyecto CAMBio, in terms of credit, TA and Bio award provided (data December 2012) . Five other Guatemalan institutions im 10 -plemented the programme: in December 2012, the large majority of investments were in the promotion of agroforestry in coffee and cardamom plantations.
According to the data provided by Génesis, the institution provided credit to 9,529 clients (4,809,624.29 USD), technical assistance to 3,616 and the Bio Award to 1,886, targeting mainly coffee and cardamom producers as its competitors. Indeed Proyecto CAMBio was implemented in 26 branches: 45% of CAMBio's credit was awarded in the Alta Verapaz department, where cardamom and coffee are very common along with subsistence crops. The most common contract for rural producers is 30% annual rate (2.5% per month), with bullet payment for the capital and monthly installments for the interest. There are administrative expenses that are paid monthly together with the interest. To obtain credit under Proyecto CAMBio, clients were to commit to one these indicators: maintenance of the forest; establishment and maintenance of native shadow trees; diversification of shadow with native shadow trees; living fence with native trees of multiple use.
As previously mentioned, Génesis, as an institution operating in a complex relational process, changed and adapted the project according to the SES, its needs and clients. Importantly to mention, most modifications were discussed with and approved by the CABEI.
In first place, Génesis decided not to create a specific financial product, mainly to reduce the high transaction costs that it would have entailed. Hence, Génesis used the cheaper financial resources received through Proyecto CAMBio to provide credit at the same conditions (in terms of interest rate and loan duration) as standard credit. Indeed, the average loan of Proyecto CAMBio credit was 502 USD, very close to Gènesis average loan 557 USD.
Secondly, Génesis managed separately the three main components -credit, TA and Bio Award. The three components were disconnected in timing, contents and geographic areas, meaning that they were not provided according to a specific strategy: some clients only received credit, some others also TA or Bio Awards, some others all the three. The negocios (credit) department managed credit and Bio Award, while the SDE carried out the TA. The latter evolved during the three rounds, from a simple training (first round) to technical assistance (second round) to a value chain approach (third round), but involving different beneficiaries each time. As it will be shown in the ! 20 ! For more details about Génesis please see the Appendix. outcomes assessment, this separation weakened the project logic of providing credit for green investment along with necessary technical assistance to reach the indicators and comply with the conditionality, in order to eventually win the Bio Award.
Thirdly, as a result of the two previous points, it is difficult to regard the Bio Award as a PES on the basis of its definition. Only a part of the clients (around 60-70% of the 9,529 clients, according to anecdotal evidence) signed the commitment form with the environmental indicators, which had been cut down to four simplified ones from the fourteen available for the agroforestry sector. None of the clients, nevertheless, remembered the commitment. Eventually, 2,233 clients were pre-selected for the verification and the 84% met the requirements. The small number of pre-selected clients depends on the high transaction costs that the operations related to the verification of the Bio Award required.
Overall, Génesis pointed at reducing as much as possible the costs related to the implementation of such a complex programme, lacking experience and expertise. One explanation is that Génesis, as an NGO constantly looking for new sources, has a short-medium term vision, which penalises a more structured and comprehensive strategy toward its clients. While the project itself presented innovative features, Génesis shaped its implementation according to its SES, taking as fewer risks as possible. Another explanation that emerged from discussions with the staff regards the capabilities of the beneficiaries to understand the project and absorb its complexities: in order to make it more accessible, the MFI simplified many processes (e.g. the green indicators). On the down side, it might have reduced the project potentialities: for example, some of beneficiaries who received the Bio Award were told they had won a lottery, to avoid other complains and misunderstanding from other non-winning clients in the community, hindering the hypothetical influxes of a proactive attitude.
Outcomes assessment
In this subsection we analyse in detail if the intervention of Proyecto CAMBio has the potentialities to influence habits and development pathways (the interactions between microscopic and the macroscopic part of the system, as explained in section 2) to revert the socio-economic exclusive and environmentally dangerous dynamics described in the previous subsection. To this aim we analysis the programme along the outcomes assessment as proposed in section 2.
Targeting
Génesis centred the project mainly on coffee and cardamom producers: the choice of this target group translates into fostering present trends and enhance capacities (human and financial) more than redirecting productive strategies as in the case of cattle-raisers in Nicaragua (see below).
The department of Alta Verapaz represented the 45% of credit, 54% of total clients, 71% of clients who received TA, 82% of the clients who were selected for the Bio Award. The Bio award was implemented only in 13 branches against the 26 who took part to the project, the same number as for the TA, with 7 branches in common between the two. In line with what the staff reported, the three components targeted different clients: credit was widely distributed without strict criteria; TA was planned more on a geographic base in order to concentrate the efforts, involving a limited numbers of branches at each round; while the Bio Award -considered the most relevant -was destined to the very core target of the project. Central office and local branches reported conflicting answers regarding the selections of the names for credit and TA, as the former claimed of having only selected the areas (according to CAMBio's eligibility criteria) and not the clients, while the latter referred to have been provided with a blocked list. The selection at central level, where information is probably weaker, might explain why some of the beneficiaries were not part of the intended main target group (cardamom and coffee producers). On the other hand, the pre-selection for the Bio Award was carried out locally: staff reported selecting "good clients", in terms of repayment history and engagement in their work.
In the sample, 50% of the beneficiaries consider cardamom their primary source of income; the 19% coffee and cardamom equally; 5% coffee and the remaining referred to another type of crop. Producers have small plots of land compared to Nicaragua's sample (mean 6.7 ha; median 4.9 ha): 58% own it legally; 20% does not; 9% have communal land; 6% rent the land and another 6% is currently paying their land to the government-funded programme. Interestingly, interviewees of-! 21 ten hesitated and asked clarification regarding the question whether they own legally the land as well as regarding its size, suggesting that the issues of legal property is still blurry for many rural producers. Only 56% reported having at least a part of land covered with forest, even though it was not always possible to quantify the dimension. According to the Progress out of Poverty Index survey, the 60% of the sample has between 90% and 100% of possibilities of being under the poverty line, with only the 5% having less than 60%. Worse, the 23% have between 80% and 100% of possibilities of living in extreme poverty and the 55% between 40% and 60%.
Combining a definite picture of the target group with the operational analysis, it is possible to place in better perspective mechanisms and goals of the project. Génesis did not engage with a group considered to be environmentally dangerous: on the contrary, it focused on a type of activity (such as agroforestry) that is intrinsically positive for the environment. Therefore, the potential outcomes of the project will be more limiting damages and increasing the natural potentialities than promoting new activities. The target group, compared to the Nicaraguan case (see below), appear more similar to the coffee producers area (the Northern region), than to the cattle-raisers' (Central region).
Additionality
Having seen the target group and the operational strategies, it is most likely that additionality might derive more from the improvement of usual activities than from the promotion of new ones. Even so, according the primary data, the project had a very small degree of additionality, which mainly derived from the TA. As expected, the credit awarded through Proyecto CAMBio did not generate any new investment and was spent as working capital. As clients could not identify the loan received within CAMBio, they were asked how they spent their previous loans to verify any change. 76.5% of the clients spent at least part and the 36% all of their credit in Proyecto CAMBio activities, which are considered to be cardamom, coffee and organic fertilizer, independently of the specific expenditure (for example seeds, daily workers). Proyecto CAMBio did not influence short or medium term investments, most likely due to absence of a specific line of credit, with different terms and a more definite conditionality.
Similarly, the Bio Award did not provoke any variation before its reception -that is, it did not modify a specific behaviour of the potential beneficiaries though the perspective of winning the price. Nevertheless, within the 75% of the interviewed who received the award, 13% spent in trees, 4% in organic fertilizer, 14% spent in cardamom and coffee. While the latter group followed the usual habits as with the loans, the first two are undoubtedly a direct consequence of Proyecto CAMBio. Therefore, positive outcomes emerged from the transformed role of the Bio Award, which eventually contributed to raise awareness more than remunerate an environmental service. In principle, this is in line with Génesis approach of considering the Bio Award as the core of the project to reward the clients who were already complying, being engaged mostly in agroforestry activities.
The primary data clearly show that TA produced the higher degree of additionality compared to the other two components, as summarized in Table 3. ! Nevertheless, these data should be carefully considered, as beneficiaries responded in front of a member of Génesis, sometimes the same person who carried out the TA. The additionality remains very low: the changes mentioned regard, for example, transplanting few new trees in the plot or seeding according to a specific technique, but they are far from drastically increasing productivity and income, especially in this difficult period of low prices and widespread plagues. 
Sustainability
Considering the small degree of additionality, there might be optimism for the sustainability of the project: the small changes in production practices did not require trade-offs or significant efforts; beneficiaries reported a better knowledge and productivity; the latter round of TA provided the basement for a long term strategy. Furthermore, the beneficiaries operated the changes without the goal of gaining the Bio Award, therefore they should continue even without the promise of compensation. Even so, there is room for doubt, as there are not quantitative data of the stated improvements and interviewees' knowledge seemed weak once questioned more in depth. The great potential in this situation resides in Génesis, as a permanent actor who will continue to interact with the beneficiaries in their SES, as opposed to many development programmes. As repeatedly argued in this paper, if Génesis is able to construct a comprehensive strategy that directly challenge the SES, building on CAMBio's experience (with particular reference to the third round of TA), it can assure the continuation of acquired practices.
Externalities
In the case of Guatemala, the implementation was looser than in Nicaragua (see below). For this reason, there are no data on the area of farm dedicated to Proyecto CAMBio or on the specific expenditure of a loan. Even more, beneficiaries could not identify the loan under Proyecto CAMBio from other loans, therefore the use of the credit was verified by comparisons with previous and following loans. The analysis of externalities is therefore structured on three groups of sub-analysis: firstly, the distribution of the credit, to assess whether a specific group of clients received higher amounts than others and verify distributional implications; secondly, the distribution of the Bio Award, to similarly understand if any group was preferred; thirdly, the mapping of the credit spent outside Proyecto CAMBio's activities.
The distribution of the credit analysis intends to assess whether there was any bias in the provision of credit for a specific category of clients of the sample, who have been grouped by: socio-demographic variables; branch; activity (coffee and/or cardamom as primary source of income, coffee and/or cardamom as secondary source of income, those without coffee or cardamom); PPI score; number of operations (with Génesis, i.e. number of loans received so far); area of the farm. As it was not possible to trace the specific investments, in this study case we cannot refer to under-or over-financed investments, as instead in the case of Nicaragua (see below).
Interestingly, only the branch and activity variables showed a significant correlation with the amount of credit. More in details, the sample shows that those clients and branches that in principle represented the core of the project -namely Cobán and San Pedro Carchá, those with a higher presence of cardamom and coffee producers -received relatively lower amounts of credit. Table  4 illustrates the dispersion of the clients per branch and activity, with the relative means.
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Several clients from the San Luis branch are closer to urban areas and also engage in petty trade, which could partly explain the higher amount. Besides, as both branches are administratively part of Petén, it could also be related Génesis local policy. Hence, according to the analysis, the tendency is that the clients who received a higher amount of credit are those served by the branches of San Luis and Raxruhá, who probably engage in other activities than coffee or cardamom.
The second group of analysis on the distribution of the Bio Award has a similar aim, but with significant differences. The process to obtain to the Bio Award had two steps: first, Génesis had to preselect a number of clients potentially qualifying; second, the CABEI would visit these clients to verify the compliance with the environmental indicators. Only 2,233 (on 9,529) were pre-selected to receive the Bio Award, 52 out of 64 in the sample: the branch who provided the larger loans (San Luis) was not considered for the Bio Award, due to Génesis strategy of implementing the Bio Award component only in the areas considered to be the focus of the project. Tables 511 illustrates the distribution of clients selected for branch and activity. ! 24
Lastly, the investment of Proyecto CAMBio's credit outside its foreseen activities can provide a picture of what other activities have been financed with the green credit, firstly in terms of percentage of clients, secondly in terms of percentage of credit. I considered the evaluation of how the credit was spent weaker in terms of data soundness, because: a) clients could not identify the loan under Proyecto CAMBio; 2) clients could not identify and quantify precisely the investments.
As illustrated earlier, 76.5% of the clients spent at the least part of their credit in activities promoted by Proyecto CAMBio and only 36% spent the whole amount in them. Not forgetting that it is not possible to trace the actual expenditures, according to the data collected those who invested only a part for Proyecto CAMBio spent the rest in (% of interviewees): other cultivations (58%, mainly corn); animals (42%, mainly fowl); and trade (4%). Those who spent the entire credit outside Proyecto CAMBio, invested mainly in other crops (73%, especially corn); animals (40%, mainly fowl), trade (4%); and chemical fertilizer (4%). Table shows how the producers spent their credit, divided for activity. Once again, as it appeared in the additionality analysis, producers used the loans according to their habits.
Diversification in investments seems a common trend in all categories, even though from the interviews it emerged that most producers have only one main source of income and started diversifying more after the prices fall. The other crop category mainly refers to corn, which the most com- ! 25 mon subsistence crop. Similarly, fowl is mostly for domestic consume and seldom an additional income. Indeed, the most common food among rural farmers consists in corn tortillas, chicken and beans.
The same grouping can be done with amount of credit in place of the number of credit. The total loan was considered, as it was not possible to quantify the single expenditure. Table 7 shows the investments within and outside Proyecto CAMBio in percentage of credit.
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In economic terms, the part of credit invested outside Proyecto CAMBio grows of six points compared to the previous table, while the part invested exclusively in it decreases of five points, which is in line with the results of the distribution of the credit seen above. It is possible to see that a considerable amount of credit ended up in other activities beyond Proyecto CAMBio, which seems logical due to the lack of real conditionality and high credit amounts granted to non coffee/cardamom producers.
Grasping the outcomes on the environment is harder, as none of the activities conducted by the clients are clearly environmentally risky, like it will be instead highlighted in the Nicaraguan case in the next case study. An interesting data is that 3.9% of the beneficiaries interviewed (corresponding to 3% of credit -total loans) declared to buy chemical fertilizer, even though it is extremely likely that a higher number of clients actually did, considering their very common use. While this is certainly not a relevant amount of clients/credit, this data provides a simple example how difficult it is to change the habits: the production of organic fertilizer is among the most common trainings provided by Génesis and farmers are usually interested because of its low cost. Nevertheless, probably because it takes time to prepare it and to be ready to use, many simply go back to buying chemical fertilizer, which is more expensive and more dangerous. A similar trend, in another rural microfinance programme has been observed in (Forcella, 2013) .
It is very clear from the analysis, as mentioned for the additionality before, that the credit did not produce any additionality. While it did not either finance or increment any environmentally negative activity, it continued to foster local habits and dynamics.
Governance
In first place, it is useful to understand why Génesis decided to take part to Proyecto CAMBio. According to the institution, the reasons were: 1) to promote its image and reputation brining innovation in the development of Guatemala; 2) to increase clients retention face to the growing competition; 3) to obtain additional and cheaper funds; 4) to increase clients productivity and repayment capacity. These answers partly confirm the previous assumptions made on what influenced Géne-sis in designing and implementing the project: for example, there was no explicit mention of environmental protection or biodiversity preservation. Because clients did not choose whether to take part to the project, it is not possible to asses their motivation. ! 26
Overall, it appears that Génesis lacked a sound strategy, most likely due to two main factors: in first place, Génesis lacked expertise, as it had never addressed environmental issues before, and struggled to handle all the transaction costs (especially at administrative level) that the project required. Secondly, the credit department and the SDE work very independently, with limited collaboration. This was clear in Proyecto CAMBio, where staff from the two departments had poor knowledge on the others' doing. For instance, trainers were not involved in the selection of clients for the Bio Award, even though they were the ones who could closer monitoring their doings. This disconnection might have impeded the creation of synergies and leaked resources.
Main Conclusions from the Guatemala case
This two-steps framework allows to first understand how the same project was actually implemented by different actors in different SESs, and why; and then to proceed with analysis of the outcomes analysis having a comprehensive base. The case of Génesis in Guatemala generates many valuable considerations.
In first place, Génesis faced serious difficulties to implement the project, which was designed to cover a wide-range of actors and activities in five different countries. Not differently from its own clients, Génesis struggled to change its procedures, from the provision of credit to the content of the trainings. Complex projects such as Proyecto CAMBio imply high costs, which are not only the sources directly invested, but also high transaction costs paid by the implementing partners. Therefore, the analysis regards not only how Génesis implemented CAMBio, but how it was designed since the real beginning, and whether Génesis had the possibilities, financially and in human resources, to act differently and more proactively. Green microfinance programme should engage the institutions and their SES in first place, as permanent agents of change that have a continuous interaction with the target group.
As illustrated, Proyecto CAMBio poorly interacted with the complex socio-economic environmental dynamics: quite the opposite, it simply followed the tracks marked by the SES: credit was spent in working capital as "business as usual" and was not driven by the PES compliance. Without a specific green product and the related conditionality, and considering the unsuitableness of the standard product offered (low amount and short term), this missed interaction is hardly surprising. Choosing a target group composed of small, poor and not-organized producers requires a more structural and long-term engagement to truly address the root of their chronic poverty and exclusion. For example, a different kind of credit -maybe a community/village credit, or longer termthat could allow the purchase of a machine to dry the cardamom cherries. Of course, this example would require a basic organization on the part of the producers and preferably the involvement of the local community. Instead, the credit provided through Proyecto CAMBio was spent according to the habits, without generating any additionality, sustaining the current socio-economic inequalities trends, but at least without increasing them. Similarly, the Bio Award simply called the attention of the beneficiaries, but it was neither a compensation for a service nor a price for a commitment. As a matter of fact, the most common indicator was the maintenance of the forest and beneficiaries complied without even knowing they were part of the programme, confirming the lack of additionality of the PES tool.
What it is very relevant in this scenario is the evolution of the TA, which moved from basic trainings to a value chain approach: this is the only area where some changes were visible and where there are indeed great potentialities. Beneficiaries acquired new knowledge that could eventually lead to an increase of productivity and have been introduced to the value chain of their products, giving them the possibility to understand how to better interact with it. Encouraging and assisting producers to join organizations is essential for grating access to long-term TA and credit.
Proyecto CAMBio has the merit of having introduced the environmental discourse within Génesis, linking for the first the productivity of the clients with the environment, which appeared particularly relevant in this period of prices crisis. The MFI has built precious expertise during the implementation of the project and should employ it to develop a comprehensive green strategy that reduce the vulnerability of both the institutions and its clients. It will be fundamental to review its internal system between the credit and the training department, which could significantly increase its productivity, especially the monitoring of the clients.
The example of Genesis clearly shows how habits and development pathways directly influenced ! 27 the choices of the intermediary institution on how to actually manage the programme. In this case the part A of our methodological framework already spotted the strong influence of SES directly on the MFI. While part B confirmed the quite big inertia of habits and development pathways. Once the SES had very strong influence on the MFI then the final beneficiaries (clients) of the programme naturally followed predefined strategies and choices.
The analysis seems to supper the vision that a green microfinance programme that aims at fostering the biodiversity conservation must engage the local SES and its actors, aiming to develop a territorial approach. Providing resources without changing the channels they pass through will not redirect limited (and potentially environmentally dangerous) development pathways toward more rewarding alternatives. To do so, it is necessary to present a long-term approach that will eventually allow the beneficiaries to choose their paths, without being forced by their habits. It is important also to underline the value of alliances and collaboration with actors with similar goals and interested, also in a perspective of optimizing resources and subsidies. This was confirmed from the primary data that showed that where other agents were active (whether the national programme for reforestation, the local authorities or ngos) the beneficiaries were more aware of environmental issues and less affected by the crisis. It is indeed difficult to envisage that a programme targeting individual actors can have a sustainable environmental impact if not framed in a consistent policy that takes into considerations all the necessary socio-economic variables.
Case 2 -Nicaragua FDL-Nitlapan
We continue our analysis with a second case study: the implementation of Proyecto CAMBio done by FDL and Nitlapan in Nicaragua. As in the previous case we start with a picture of the SES and then we analyse the interaction of Proyecto CAMBio with such dynamics. This second case is particularly interesting, because, as we will see, differently from the our previous case study, the part A of our practical methodological framework will reveal an almost perfect implementation of the programme. However a careful analysis of part B will instead reveal how the strong interaction within the SES readdress the choices and actions of institutions and clients towards local habits and development pathways, implying an overall doubtful environmental outcome of the project.
The SES
Socio-economy at country level
The introduction to the "Plan Estrategico 2012-2016" of Nitlapan (Nitlapan, 2011) , written by Arturo Grigsby, offers a nice synthesis of the socio-economic condition in Nicaragua. A nice analysis of some of the policy trends in relation with rural development and inequalities can be found in (Perez, 2011) . The present section is based on these documents. Nicaragua is classified as the second poorest country among the Latin America and Caribbean countries, after Haiti. The government and World Bank data say that the 43% of the population is poor: under the national poverty line. The majority of the poor people live in rural areas (almost the 65% of the total poor population), where also live the 80% of extreme poor. The government and World Bank data show a decrease in the number of poor around 4% in the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The main causes of this decrease are identified in: migration, increase of the remittances and increase in the number of people woking in the household. Some of the background exogenous facts that allowed this decrease of the poverty level were the increase of the government expenses to reduce poverty, and the better prices of agricultural products in the last years. However it seems that these progresses in the poverty alleviation were mainly driven by an improvement of the better off among the poor. Indeed the data from the World Bank estimates that the percentage of the extreme poor is the 15% of the total population and it didn't change in the last 15 years. This data give hints towards an increase of the relative poverty of the extreme poor and hence an increase of the socio-economic inequality. The root of poverty seems indeed to be in the highly unequal access to finance and physical capital, and opportunities. An interesting data coming from an investigation done by Nitlapan together with the World Bank shows that half of the rural population does not own land. As shown by studies of the IMF, BID and CEPAL the inequalities are sustained also by the taxation system that impose higher expenses for the poorer than for the richer in proportion to their income, and the possibility for the richer to pay even less thanks to corruption. Moreover the governmental budget to reduce poverty is grabbed for the 47% by people living above the poverty line, as reported by the ! 28
World Bank. On top of that the high inequality undermine to the average economic per capita growth to reduce poverty that it is reduced only by 0.5% for every 1% increase of the average income per capita.
Environmental trends
Nicaragua has the second highest deforestation rate among the Central American countries ( However the national MF sector was hit by one of the hardest MF crisis Bastiaensen et. al. 2013; Servet, forthcoming; MixM) that produced a decrease of the 53% in the total national MF portfolio in the period 2007-2011, and an explosion of the PAR30 that increased steadily from 2007 to 2010 and it touched the 20% in 2010 and at the period of the field study it was higher than 15% at the national level. The main causes of this crisis are associated to a politically induced no repayment movement called "No Pago"; the overfunding of the MF sector and the promotion of high competition, and the strong decrease of the price of the meat and especially of the price of life cattle , that negatively impacted the rural producers and particularly the poorer ones (Perez, 2011).
Such hard crisis had deep impact on the MF sector and it influenced the disbursement policy, activities, geographical and population targeting strategies of MFIs, that under the threats of another crisis and pushed by the necessity to survive and restructure their portfolio privileged more profitable activity, less costly transaction and moreover decided to completely exclude part of the population and geographical area from credit provision.
Development pathways and socio-ecological systems in the region analysed
In this subsection we illustrate the main development pathways for our two main regions of investigation: the central and northern region.
The Central Region
One of the main historical reason for deforestation in Nicaragua is associated to extensive cattle activity used for meat production. This dynamics is pretty clear in the central region of our analysis, where the main reason for the expansion of this activity was its profitability due to the historical low price of land and the low level of control over the deforestation process. In the last ten years or so there was a partial conversion of the cattle activity towards diary production, due to the quite stable and higher market price of fresh milk. The conversion of the cattle production toward diary production should in principle intensify the cattle production strategy and decrease the deforestation rate. However the reality seems different and it underlines the complexity of the SES.
Indeed the data reported in (Polvorosa, 2013; Polvorosa 2015) concerning the central region of Matiguas show that, due to inequality of access to possibilities, markets, and capital, the ten years of diary boom, from 2001 to 2011, didn't produce the expected overall intensification of the cattle system, but they mainly induced a shift of part of the rural activity towards diary production. The advantages associated to this market opportunity were mainly grabbed by the richer and larger producers, preventing moreover a positive outcome over the environment protection.
The data in (Polvorosa, 2013; Polvorosa 2015) reveals an increase of the proportion of land devoted to the cattle raising activity from 67.4% in 2001 till 82.6% in 2011 of the land in the farm, that was grab form land previously devoted to agriculture and a reduction of the forest area. Moreover inequalities of land distribution already high in 2001 increased even more in 2011.
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The overall dynamics seems indeed to reward the larger producers, and in this way foster the perpetuation of extensive cattle, the inefficient land use and the concentration of land in a small number of large producers, the exclusion of the smaller producers and the increase of the human pressure on the forest.
The Northern Region
The Northern regions underline instead a different dynamics dominated by coffee. The areas we analyse is in the region of the natural reserve of "Penas Blancas" part of the Mesoamerical Biological corridors of very high biodiversity. People arrived there in the 1940s and supported by governmental policies they started to plant coffee. In the '90 coffee sector was liberalised. The region, recently affected before by fall of market prices for coffee and then by coffee illness, revealed the vulnerability of small-scale coffee farming, which, even if economically rentable, are more affected by recurring crisis, due to their reduced cooping capacities. Effects of such crisis forced smaller producers to reduce the area cultivated with coffee, eliminate tree shadow and planting staple crops or selling their land to larger farmers that buying cheap land in time of crisis increased even more the already strong land concentration.
So even if under different conditions also this region undergoes a raise of socio-economic inequalities and environmental degradation also due to a shift towards less traditional and more chemical supported coffee plantations, and it underline the SES to which the Proyecto CAMBio have to cope.
The interaction of Proyecto CAMBio with the SES
Operational assessment
In Nicaragua CABEI has been working with various institutions: Lafise-Bancentro, Fundeser, Coop 20 Abril and FDL. FDL is the local institution with the higher investment: a total of 2,010,588.41 USD of loan at the 31st May 2012. It had operations in 22 municipalities with 991 as total number of producers at the 31st May 2012. FDL decided to give credit, with a maximum term at 3 years and a maximum credit amount of 10,000 USD, at the 20.35% annual declining interest rate (plus commission fees of 2.5% to be paid upfront), to the producers that decide to commit part of their farm in a productive agroforestry or silvopastoral activity, with activities such as: shadow trees in pasture, cacao, coffee, living fences, water sources, etc. The CABEI provides to FDL a line of credit at around 4.5% annual interest rate. Every credit under Proyecto CAMBio, differently from what we have previously seen in the case of Guatemala, it comes with an integrated set of three elements: a reduced interest credit for investment in environmentally friendly activities classified by the project; free TA provided by Nitlapan to the clients paid by the GEF as the 10% of the credit; an environmental reward paid by the GEF for clients that after one year succeeded to fulfil all the agreed environmental indicators corresponding to 14% of the credit to the client and 6% of the credit to FDL.
Hence FDL-Nitlapan in Nicaragua and Genesis in Guatemala adopted quite a different implementation strategies for the same programme: the first one proposed and integrated packaged, while the latter separate the various element of the programme.
The implementation of the programme and its outcomes are judged very positive by the FDL, Nitlapan and the CABEI. Indeed at 31st May 2012 FDL provided credits to around 1000 farmers, for an amount corresponding at 3.6% of the total portfolio of FDL, and 1.7% of the number of credits in the same year. The total portfolio in arrears for Proyecto CAMBio was very low: 1.97%, and 0.68% is the portfolio in arrears for more than 30 days at the 31st May 2012. The average amount of influenced farm area is around 1.57 Ha per client at the national level and the number of clients was increasing year by year. TA was provided to all the farmers with between one to five visit the first year of the credit. Clients achieved to plant all the required trees with a successful rate after one years between 60% and 87% in the period 2009-2010. While interviews with managers support that almost all the clients completed the required biodiversity indicators after a certain period of time, if not the first year. From a sample of 70 producers in (Guerrero, 2012) it results that 90% of ! 30 the clients meet the interventions proposed by the contracts and received premium from the green credit .
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From this first analysis we could conclude that the implementation of Proyecto CAMBio done by Nitlapan and FDL is successful, both at the financial and at the environmental point of view, according to the criteria established by the design of the Proyecto CAMBio itself.
In the case of Nicaragua, part A of our assessment, does not reveal any relevant influence of the complexity of the SES, differently from what we observed in the case of Guatemala.
Outcomes assessment
Targeting
In a SES there are naturally some actors whose socio-economic trajectories are more environmentally friendly, while others that have instead trajectories that are intrinsically environmentally dangerous. Moreover among them there could be some farmers that, if provided with the right combination of credit, TA, subsidies could more or less easily invest in an environmentally friendly or dangerous activity. The institution managing a MF for ecosystems services product should be enough socially embedded in the territories to understand this dynamics. Moreover it should be aware of and share the objectives of the programme, and target the households that are more willing to induce environmentally positive investments also beyond the activities financed by the programme, or to target potentially more environmentally dangerous actors, but with appropriate policy, products and strategies to support a change in their habits and contribute to revert socio-economic exclusive path towards more environmentally friendly local development pathways. Targeting the right clients with the right mix of policy-products-strategies is hence the first step to assure positive environmental outcomes for the programme. However to do that there should be in place a well designed credit policy that consider the environmental risk and opportunity as a decision criteria for client selection and credit disbursement.
Unfortunately the targeting of the programme done by FDL was instead mainly implemented with a standard credit logic: mainly based on credit worthiness and fidelity. In a post-crisis period it decided to privilege old clients with good credit history and relatively bigger famers. Indeed by policy FDL decided to provide the credit within Proyeco CAMBio mainly to what they classified to be "A client": good and old clients. Moreover the PES of the programme, proportional to the credit amount, naturally induced the MFI to prefer clients with relative larger farm to poorer clients, because they can absorb more credit, then reducing the credit delivery cost for the MFI, and increasing the reward for the MFI in case of success. However, as we will see, this credit policy ended providing more funds to those clients that, due to their socio-economic characteristic, as explained in the previous subsection, are among the most environmentally dangerous among the eligible clients for the project. Instead it partially excluded that clients with smaller farm and capital that are however more likely to do environmentally friendly investments. Such targeting indeed did not revert the socio-economic exclusive dynamics in the region, but it partially supported the inequalities, that are among the causes of environmental degradation.
In this respect we see some similarity with the case in Guatemala, indeed in both cases the main targeting strategy was financial: risk reduction for the first case and profitability for the second. In both cases one of the aim was to reduce cost, while the targeting was not motivated by maximising the environmental impact of the programme.
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! At 2012 in the region of investigation.
Additionality
The analysis of the primary data outlines that the implementation of Proyecto CAMBio did not have a high degree of additionality, similarly to what we have already observed in the case of Guatemala. Proyecto CAMBio indeed does not seem to have been able to induce new choices concerning the development strategies or investments of the clients, or to influence short or medium term economic investments (see Table 8 ). Nevertheless the majority of the producers interviewed declared that they have acquired new expertise thanks to the TA, and that they are applying the acquired skills, or they would like to apply them in their activities in the farm. The importance of the TA component of Proyecto CAMBio is indeed similar to what we have seen in the case of Guatemala. This similar result induces to thing that farmers indeed appreciate external advises and trainings, and that they reveal to be useful to fulfil the objective of green microfinance programmes for ecosystems. Indeed Proyecto CAMBio, even if not able to directly influence choices of clients, that are instead meanly directed by habits and dominant development pathways, seems to be able to participate to increase the human capital of the producers and could eventually bring additionalities in the medium-long term.
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It could be interesting to separate the data more related to the economic additionally of the product: namely study if Proyecto CAMBio is financing new economic activities not previously present in the farm; from the data more related to the environmental additionally: namely study if the investment done by the producers is really supporting the plantation of new trees that producers would have not planted without Proyecto CAMBio. See Table 9 . 
Central Region
Rio Blanco Matiguas
Investment done due to specific characteristics of the loan / activity already planned independently from Proyecto CAMBio 33% / 67% 33% / 67%
New specific land in the farm dedicated to the investment done with Proyecto CAMBio, not already prepared for similar activities / Land already ready for a similar activity 12.5% / 87.5% 28% / 72%
Investment done due to the specific additional environmental value of the credit / Investment done due to its profitability or because already in short term investment strategy 0% / 100% 32% / 68%
Credit amount tailored for the specific activity financed by Proyecto CAMBio / Credit amount already decided also for other investments 50% / 50% 32% / 68%
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These data induce to think that the programme could have influenced more the quantity of the trees planted and the quality of the economic activity, than the novelty of the environmental and economic activity. This result nicely fit with the overall natural development path of low risk and investment diversification of the medium and small rural producers.
Additionality of a green MF programme for ecosystem services is important because it is what should allow the offsetting of the inertia induced by habits and development pathways and provide the first steps toward the re-establishment of a new more environmentally friendly and socio-economic inclusive equilibrium in the SES.
It is however worth to underline that a too high degree of economic additionality could be not beneficial for the clients and expose them to higher risks. Changes in livelihood paths should be reasonably smooth, happen gradually and combine with change in values, culture, and habits, which requires long term articulated strategies and investments. However the programme should have a clear path toward an overall additionality. Unfortunately this does not seem to be the case due to a lack of a clear policy that could reward the new economic and environmental investments supported by additional TA, capital and grants.
Two additional facts strengthen our claim for a reduced degree of additionally. From interviews with managers in Nitlapan, it appears clear that part of the potential additionality of the programme was reduced also as a policy choice. Indeed the number of indicators that should have been fulfilled to have access to the award has decreased year by year, because judged a too heavy burden for some of the clients. We observed a similar approach also in the case of Guatemala
Our primary data, and the analysis of secondary data, underline that various clients have received a credit with Proyecto CAMBio more than once. Among them there are various clients that invested exactly or almost exactly in the same activity (still receiving the environmental reward) implying a very low level of additionality for these producers.
A final comment is due: the degree of additionality required by a programme should be related to the local situation. Sometime additionality could also mean a faster implementation of the normal environmentally friendly development strategies of the producers through the release of the credit constraints that prevent these investments, without directly stimulating new activities. Moreover it could be also conceivable that a high degree of additionality should not be required if the programme is able to support those evolutions inside the system which go towards an environmentally friendly direction. 
Sustainability
From the analysis of the primary data, it seems that the short and medium term sustainability of the project is pretty good (see Table 10 ). In particular, the majority of the clients declared that they were realizing (at the time of the field study) or would like to realize in the future an activity similar to the one done with Proyecto CAMBio, even without the direct support of credit from the Proyecto CAMBio. Moreover the majority of the producers declared that the economic activity in which they invested in is producing or is going to produce more income for the household, and that the planted trees are or will also be a new direct source of economic income thanks fruits and wood needed to satisfy the family needs. These results would induce to believe that the households that received a credit with Proyecto CAMBio are going to maintain the planted trees and the activities they developed and potentially reproduce the activities they realized within Proyecto CAMBio.
!
The data concerning the sustainability are of course affected by some potential bias. However it is interesting to observe that the clients would in general have the incentive to show a better environmental performance for their activities, but a lower willingness to pursue such activities without additional subsidised support. That means that the overall sustainability due to potential future actions could have been overestimated, while the willingness to continue such activities also without support of Proyecto CAMBio could have instead be underestimated.
The apparent good potentiality for sustainability of the project could be also induced by the low degree of additionally (similarly to the case of Guatemala), that somehow reduced the strength of the conclusion concerning the sustainability of the project. Indeed, because it is quite difficult to exactly quantified the degree of sustainability of a programme at medium term, the high degree of sustainability at short term and the low additionally could be simply interpreted as a hint that Proyecto CAMBio, interacting with the SES, was not able to revert habits but it simply smoothly merged with the development paths of the rural producers. 
Externalities
From the previous two sections it appears that, even if with some limitations, the programme provides a certain (limited) amount of additionality that seems to be quite sustainable. This suggest that there could be some chances that the programme could, even if interacting with the SES, support new trajectories. Unfortunately we will see in this section that probably this is not the case. The analysis of externalities supports the conclusion that, due to reduced additionally, good sustainability and important externalities (as discussed here below), the programme was not able to revert the causes of environmental degradation, and sometimes it partially supported them.
We use the concept of "externalities" as defined in section 2 and adapted to the specific case of Proyecto CAMBio: all those effects on the environment and the economic investments and clients activities that are not directly constrained by Proyecto CAMBio, but that are induced, directly or indirectly by it. As we will see shortly the data and implementation of the programme in Nicaragua, allow us to do a more in dept analysis compared to what we have been able to do for the case of Guatemala. Indeed in Nicaragua, the credit, its objectives and the conditionality of the environmental reward were clearly defined, moreover the clients clearly remembered how much they invested in the various activities. All this allow us to track the cash flow of the clients and its livelihood strategy at short-medium term.
The externalities considered in this section could be divided into: "internal" ones: the investments and activities of the rural producers that influence her or his own farm outside the area in which she or he implements the activity promoted by Proyecto CAMBio; and "external" ones: the actual and potential changes in attitudes and activities of the neighbourhoods of the clients participating to Proyecto CAMBio, and the overall influence on the community, the institutions and the social values.
Due to data availability we will mainly analyse "internal" externalities, while the "external" externalities are only briefly discussed in Table 11 .
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From the Table 11 it appears that there could be good potentialities for Proyecto CAMBio to expand environmentally friendly rural practices also to other households that did not participate to the programme. This would imply the potentiality to foster and maybe sustain a systemic change towards environmentally friendly pathways.
However communicating with other households or share experiences does not automatically means a proactive up taking of the activities fostered by the programme by neighbourhoods, or the spread of such practices through cooperatives. Indeed to understand how this communication could influence the decisions and choices we should better understand how rural producers interpret the programme. The section on additionality shows that change in habits was rather small, and the motivations to receive the credit was not directly for environmental reasons but rather economical and embedded in the usual livelihood strategies of the households. ! 35
The output of such exchange depend indeed on the information exchanged and how it is interpreted. Indeed in the coffee regions near Masicio Penas Blancas, in the Northern Region, in other field work presently under publication, it appears that Proyecto CAMBio diffuses somehow the attitude that rural producers should be paid to plant trees within coffee, activity that has been done naturally by the farmers before the intervention of the programme. The same farmers indeed sometimes started to demand to be paid to plant trees: a perverse result of the incentive mechanisms. This possibility is well known in the Payments for Environmental Services literature, where it is argued that paying for a services it could induce a shift in social and environmental value with dangerous consequences on environmental conservation itself.
To have a better picture on what are the potentiality and constraints of microfinance programmes for ecosystem conservation, it is worth to observe what we called the "internal" externalities. Assessing the change (or not) in the choices of investments and decisions of clients participation to Proyecto CAMBio within her/his farm would indeed provides a handle on how Proyecto CAMBio has been able (or not) to influence the habits and as consequences the local development path and to redirect (or not) the environmentally disruptive and socio-economic excluding development pathways and habits. We use the investments done by the clients in other part of the farm, not constrained by Proyecto CAMBio, as a proxy for the interaction between Proyecto CAMBio and the SES, the ones we refer to in section 2 as the "interactions" between the micro and the macro structure of the system.
In Table 12 we provide some data characterising the "internal" externalities of the programme.
Extensive cattle raising is one of the main cause of deforestation. Land accumulation is a proxy for such disruptive pathways.The change in the size of the farm seems to be an issue in Rio Blanco, where the producers that increase their farm size also declared that cattle raising is their main activity, while it does not seem to be relevant in Matiguas. The observed different pattern of land accumulation between Matiguas and Rio Blanco nicely match with the macroscopic dynamics that shows that the majority of the land market activity is presently taking place in Rio Blanco, while similar processes took place in Matiguas 15-20 years ago reducing the present availability of land and hence its land dynamics. Nevertheless the direct impact of Proyecto CAMBio on this land dynamics is quite reduced, mainly due to the small average amount of credit. However it appears clear in the table that the SES and the associate dominant development pathway have important influence on the clients choices, that, embedded in an environmentally destructive pathway, they keep on reproducing it even if they receive an external intervention that aims to be environmentally friendly.
The fact that people plant new trees after having completed the investment with Proyecto CAMBio seems a positive data, however it should confronted with the reduced level of additionally, and it is should be probably interpreted as "normal" activity, that would have been done, at least in part, also without the external intervention.
An important part of Table 12 is dedicated to understand the investments done by the clients with the credit received from the Proyecto CAMBio: how many clients invested the credits in other activities and how much they invested in absolute amount and in percentage of the credit. How the clients use the money received by Proyecto CAMBio is not only a measurement of the effectiveness of the project but also of how and if it has been able to interact or redirect SES .
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The subdivision of the activities as environmentally neutral or dangerous is a bit arbitrary and questionable, but it is quite effective and simple and it matches with the environmental problems produced by the extensive cattle and illustrated in the previous sections.
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It is however important to underline that it is quite common that part of the credit received by a MFI is used by the 12 clients for activities different from the ones she or he declared, see for example (Collins et al., 2009) or (Guérin et al., 2011) , and that it is not easy to track the real investment done by the producers with the credit they received due to the fungibility of money. Table 12 shows that great majority of the producers use the credit provided by FDL to invest also in other activities in addition to the activity they engaged with in Proyecto CAMBio, and that the amount of credits spent for the environmentally friendly activity of the programme is only around half of the credit and in some cases even less. Table 12 illustrates that clients invest both in additional environmentally friendly activities, but also in environmentally dangerous activities. All these investments are not seen or checked by the programme, but they are directly subsidised and supported by it.
! ! ! ! From Table 12 it appears that the credit received by the producers sources of our primary data, is bigger than the amount of money needed to realise the activity the clients engaged with in Proyecto CAMBio. Indeed such clients use the same credit to invest also in other activities in addition to of the one agreed with Proyecto CAMBio. This observed (uneven, see later) "over financing" is not peculiar of our sample, but it is indeed intrinsic in all the portfolio of Proyecto CAMBio.
The analysis of the database of Nitlapan concerning the first 838 clients shows that the credit 13 provided by FDL is on average bigger than the cost of the agreed activity. The computation is done using the data concerning the cost of the various activities as computed by Nitlapan (see Figure   14 4).
If FDL credit was exactly the amount required for the committed activity, all the points in Figure 4 on the left should stay in the line drawn in the middle. The points above the line are the clients that received a credit amount bigger than the cost estimated by Nitlapan, while the ones below are the clients that received a credit smaller than the required amount needed as computed by Nitlapan: from now on we will call them over financed and sub financed producers.
Even if the producers receive a credit from FLD that is on average bigger than the required amount for the declared activity, this "over financing" is not systematic and there exists an important number of producers that receive an amount of credit smaller than the one that would be required to realize the compromised activity (these clients are then forced to compose the credit with other sources of funds, or to overwork to realise the required investment)
The rest of the credit is invested in other activities that are not subjected to any control by the Proyecto CAMBio but that are directly supported by it throughout fundings and subsidies. In this black box we find both additional environmentally friendly investments and environmentally dangerous investment such as pasture without trees or cattle (that are forbidden by the project). Cattle could also be a buffer in case of shock for the clients, however in all the interviewed producers they were not accompanied with any of the silvopasture environmentally friendly activities classified in Proyecto CAMBio.
The existence of systematic non-alignment of credit with the required investment (Figure 4) , and the observed cash flow in two regions with quite different socio-economic dynamics, make us arguing that such phenomenon is pretty general.
In particular it shows that Proyecto CAMBio was not able to change the habits of clients that indeed reproduce the usual development pathways (with socio-economic and environmental drawbacks), and of the MFI that, looking to reduce its cost, try to target that producers that can absorb more credit and not the ones that can induce better environmental changes.
It is interesting to observe that the exceeding amount of credit in absolute value and in percentage, for both samples, is almost equally distributed among what we classified as positive and negative externalities.
The analysis done in Figure 4 for the full portfolio of Proyecto CAMBio, can be replicate to specific regions and activities with similar results (Forcella, 2012) . It then appears quite clear that the credit allocation of Proyecto CAMBio was not driven by the environmental investment, but instead more on others drivers such as the region, activities, kind of producers, etc. that threat to undermine the environmental outcomes of the project itself.
Indeed, Even if on average the clients receive more credits than the one they would need to invest in the activity proposed by Proyecto CAMBio (547 USD excess of credit on average, from an analysis of the first 838 contracts (Forcella, 2012) ) this is not systematic: credits for silvopasture activities are on average more over financed (1314 USD excess on average), with respect to agroforestry that is instead much less (86 USD excess on average). Some regions are systematically over financed, such as the silvopasture activities in Rio Blanco, while others are systematically under financed, such as agroforestry activities in San Jose Bocay, others like in the case of agroforestry activities in Matiguas almost do not have any correlation between the credit received and activity that should be implemented, and there are as much overfinanced than underfinaced clients. Detailed activities financed also influence the credit allocation: with for example cacao systematically overfinanced in Matiguas while coffee is systematically underfinanced in the same region. Indeed looking at Figure 4 it is clear that environmental betterment of the investment was not a strategy of the credit allocation, while the drivers were others. In the Figure 4 we see as much clients over financed as clients under financed. Even if on average every client planted 96 trees and every tree was paid on average 3.9 USD, there were some clients that received less than 0.5 USD while others received till 12 USD per tree planted. This difference in reward per tree, that should instead provides a quite similar environmental service and hence receives a similar PES, can be hardly justified by an environmental logic. It seems instead the footprint showing that the environmental reward, influenced by the SES, ended to support other local dynamics.
To better understand the dynamics of over and under financing and its consequences on environmental outcomes it is worth splitting our sample and do a simple analysis per type of client.
It is reasonable that the project is biased towards larger producers, due to their ability to grab opportunities, and the reduced cost for the MFI to provide them services. Different farmers have different investment logics: for example it is reasonable that established farmers with profitable activities (see for example extensive cattle raising) do not want to change their main production, and they are not willing to engage an important part of their land in a new activity. At the same time they would probably aim to maximise the amount of credit they could receive to invest it in their more profitable activity. On the other side smaller farmers, that due to capital and land constraints cannot have access to profitable activities such as extensive cattle raising, would instead reasonably try to grab the opportunity to improve their production. Constrained by the reduced amount of ! 39 credit and land, they would at the same time aiming to diversify and intensify their production. However they are not the best target for the MFI, because too costly and less profitable.
From an analysis of primary data it results that farmers with larger farm are more prone to invest 15 a bigger amount of the excess of the credit in activities that have potentially in negative externalities . On the other hand the clients that have smaller farms seems to be the ones that naturally 16 invest more in environmentally friendly activities .
17
Looking at the sample primary data for clients in Rio Blanco and Matiguas (33 in total) in term of primary activities (the activity the clients declare to be the one that produces more income) it appears and interesting picture: diversified clients (with more than one principal activity) invest their excess of credit in positive and negative externalities in a way quite similar to the average client; while the clients that have cattle or coffee as principal activity acts in opposite way: the first one invest the excess of credits more in environmentally dangerous activities, while the second ones invest more the excess of credits in additional environmentally friendly activities (see Table 13 ).
! !
A reduced sample of data from Matiguas provides further insides concerning the SES influence on the programme outcomes , see Table 14. 18 ! ! ! ! ! To provide such detailed analysis unfortunately the data sample should be further reduced to only 11 contracts: 5 con 18 -tracts with cattle as main activity (83% of the cattle raisers in our sample) and 6 contracts with coffee as main activity (55% of the coffee producers in our sample). The remaining clients were disregarded, due to the absence of important information or lack of soundness of the data.
!
The data from Table 14 represents a too small sample to be representative, however it allows fostering some reflections concerning the interaction of Proyecto CAMBio with the SES and underling a, at the first glance possibly surprising, picture, that is however very in line with the known development pathways in the region.
Indeed, even if the surface of influence of the Proyecto CAMBio for cattle raisers is bigger (1.3 Ha compared to 0.8 Ha), the global positive impact on the environment of the cattle producers is only 1.6 Ha compared to the 1.7 Ha of the coffee producers. The coffe raisers clients, by their nature, invest more in environmentally friendly activities, also independetly from Proyecto CAMBio. Moreover the cost in term of the subsidy (represented by the Bio Premio) to obtain this overall positive environmental impact (Bio Premio over the committed area plus the area with positive externalities) is 170 USD per Ha for the cattle producers, while it is only 94 USD per Ha for the coffee producers.
These results underline some potentially dangerous trade-offs between the financial and the environmental outcomes of MF for ecosystem services. The financial logic would push towards larger credits or better off clients, but this larger credit could have an over all negative impact on the environment, even if they have bigger impact in term of the agreed environmentally friendly activities. Smaller producers, who seem to have better externalities for the environment, are instead less financed probably due to their reduced repayment capacity, and habits by MFI.
Indeed it seems that there are certain categories of producers, that even if less profitable for the MFI, have bigger positive overall impacts on the environment and are less costly in term of subsidies. However they are not rewarded by the MF credit policy. MFI instead has the tendency to reward those producers that are more profitable, but that, in the sample just described, are also the ones that naturally generate the larger amount of negative externalities for the environment and are more costly in term of environmental subsidies. ! 41
This conclusion is obtained from the analysis of a small sample and a more in-depth analysis would be required to better understand this phenomenon. However this trend seems to nicely agree with the more general picture provided by (Polvoorosa, 2013; Polvorosa 2015) and summarized in section 5.2.1 about the dynamics in Matiguas: richer farmers more easily grab the market opportunities and they are the ones that are more likely to invest in environmentally dangerous activities; a similar dynamics seems also to act at the national scale, as explained in (Nitlapan, 2011) and summarized in section 5.2.1.
Governance
Proyecto CAMBio is a programme with many stakeholders. Synergies of objectives and procedures among the various actors should be assured to reach the aimed programme's outcome: biodiversity conservation. In this section we quickly explore some of the potential issues concerning the governance of the programme, that could support some of issues we observed in the dimensions targeting, additionality, sustainability, and the generations of externalities. Let us start stating the claimed objective for the programme according to the various stakeholders :
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• Producers decide to ask for a credit with Proyecto CAMBio with the aim to improve their economic condition, diversify their production, and because they observe that there start being a lack of natural resources (mainly wood and water) to support family's livelihood.
• Nitlapan decided to engage in Proyecto CAMBio to foster the development of rural communities and protect the environment.
• FDL had as main driver the aim to keep good clients in a hard moment of crisis, and reward the farmers that had a good history of environmentally friendly activities. Moreover it also claims that Proyecto CAMBio is an opportunity to maintain, at least part of, its focus, in the rural sector that indeed became a dangerous part of the FDL portfolio, due to the crisis. On top of that FDL see environmental conservation as a responsibility of a MFI that want provide services to the rural sector.
• CABEI is pushed by financial inclusion, that it believes should go together with the financing of environmentally friendly activities.
First of all it is important to observe that, among the main motivations of the various actors, the preservation of the environment as such does not appear as a direct objective, but it is mainly related to other motivations, such as the development of rural communities, the financial inclusion, the scarcity of natural resources.
Even if it is possible to find some similarities among motivations, such as the rural development, there are conflicts among stakeholders' objectives that could become important: e.g. the diversification strategy of the producers with respect to the environmental conservation aim of Nitlapan, or the financial inclusion aimed by CABEI with respect to the objective of FDL to keep or reward good clients, or the potential trade-offs between development and environmental conservation, as present in almost all the actors.
In the present environmentally destructive and socio-economic excluding pathways, diversification could imply that part of the available resources will be invested also in environmentally dangerous activities. The objective to keep the good clients would imply a shift of targeting from the clients that have better chances to have a positive outcomes on the environment to the clients that are more profitable (that used to be the more capitalised and environmentally dangerous). The objective to foster rural development, that could seems at first as positive, is instead embedded in a dynamics that associate rural development with extensive cattle raiding, and hence potentially environmentally dangerous.
It is normal that different stakeholders have different objectives. The main issue is to assess if there exists the right mechanisms to prevent that the potential different interpretations of the objectives of the programme by the various actors could create conflicts and undermine the synergies among their operations. Such synergies are necessary to conspire to fulfil the main mission of the program: reforestation and biodiversity preservation.
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! These information come from interviews with staff members of Nitlapan, FDL, CABEI, and clients.
The complete analysis of these mechanisms is quite involved and we do not have the right data to undergo such analysis. However here we just want to raise some of the potential weak points that appeared in the interviews with some of the representatives of the various stakeholders.
The first drawback at the organisational level is the absence of frequent meetings between Nitlapan and FDL, the two main institutions that are at the core of the operations of the product. Indeed both institutions do what they are supposed to do within their duties for the programme, but in an autonomous way without looking to align their potentially diverging objectives. This result is very similar to what we have found in the case of Guatemala, where the operations of the department providing credits and the one providing TA were not coordinated.
At practical level for example Nitlapan does not participate to the credit committee when FDL assess the credit applications of the clients. Moreover the dossier used by FDL in the credit committee is the standard one, used for every other credit of FDL, and it does not include any specific environmental criteria or the information regarding the actual cost of the activity the producer is supposed to realize. The absence of these mechanisms seems to imply that the market logic prevails over the environmental one, and it induces or supports the pattern of externalities we observed in the previous section.
Main Conclusions from the Nicaragua case
The application of our methodological framework to the implementation of Proyecto CAMBio done in Nicaragua by FDL and Nitlapan allowed to investigate how microfinance for ecosystem services interacts with the SES. In this particular case study it appears that the local institutions implemented the programme as designed by CABEI, GEF and UNDP, and they have been able to deal with complex partnership and provide, in an efficient way, a complex set of services consisting of credit, TA and PES. A relevant amount of clients partecipated to the programme and they successfully implemented the agreed environmentally friendly activity. These results confirm that complex microfinancial programmes for ecosystem conservation can be successfully implemented by certain MFIs. It underlines the good potentiality for microfinance programmes for ecosystem services and it opens the way to a better understanding and implementation of strategies and products.
However, even if the programme has been successfully implemented, the application of our methodological framework underlines the overall doubtful environmental outcomes. Indeed a careful analysis of the outcomes assessment part or our framework reveals that habits and dominant pathways strongly influenced the choices and actions of intermediary financial institutions and clients. The MFI prefers to target better-off clients and more profitable activities, instead of potentially more environmentally rewarding ones. The additionality of the programmes was rather low, also confirmed by a high sustainability of the reduced changes in the production done mainly along the usual dominant pathways. The credits allocation, driven by a standard credit logic, tended to generate important externalities that seem to reinforce the existing socio-economic inequalities and the causes supporting environmentally dangerous development pathways. The governance of the programme was not driven by a common environmental objective and it undermines potential synergies, fundamental to reach positive outcomes on the ecosystems.
The implementation of Proyecto CAMBio in Nicaragua was then not able to revert the habits and development pathways that sustain environmental degradation. The complexity of the SES was not carefully considered. It appears hence quite clear the limitations of microfinance for ecosystems services that focus too much on the abstract individual actors, instead of trying to cope with the causes that sustain environmental degradation and socio-economic exclusion.
However the analysis also underlines the possibility to implement such MF for ecosystem programmes that, considering the complexity of the SES, could engage in a transformative path of the local dynamics in articulation with local actors and territorial dynamics. Such collective and informed strategies should have better chances to generate the expected positive environmental outcomes.
Conclusions
In the present paper we have discussed the possible role of microfinance to support ecosystems conservation.
We have introduced what we consider an appropriate theoretical framework inside
! 43 which such programmes should be analysed, and we have developed a practical methodological framework that provide a structured, but flexible, tool to assess such programmes. In particular we have investigated the implementation of Proyecto CAMBio, the first large-scale microfinance programme for biodiversity conservation. Our analysis provides two main conclusions. On one side, there is an impelling need for mechanisms that, working at households level, can promote environmentally friendly rural development and reduce the environmental risk of institutions and clients. Microfinance could play that role: part of the implementation of Proyecto CAMBio explicitly show that there are institutions that could run successfully complex microfinance programmes for ecosystems conservation; while for other institutions such programmes could be the first step to introduce environmental elements in their portfolio and clients' activities, and encourage further reflection and actions. On the other side, our analysis clearly underlines the importance of considering the complex socioecological system in which rural clients and institutions are embedded. Indeed, it appears that choices and actions of institutions and clients are not simply the results of rational benefits and loss computations, but they are instead driven by local habits and development pathways. In such complex reality, the intervention of microfinance programmes for ecosystem conservation targeting single actors (clients or institutions) inevitably interacts with the socio environmental systems, which redirect the choices and investments of institutions and clients towards pre-existing habits and development pathways. In a situation dominated by socio-economic inequalities and environmental degradation, the microfinance intervention runs the risk of indirectly supporting the dynamics that wants to fight, providing doubtful overall environmental outcomes.
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We believe that microfinance can have an important role to play in ecosystems conservation. However, to be able to foster environmentally friendly rural development, microfinance should attempt to articulate with relevant actors in local territories and aim at supporting new alliances and habits inside the socio-environmental systems. The objective should be to offset the causes of environmental degradation and redirect the existing pathways toward more sustainable ones.
Our analysis seems to support the utility of the framework we have developed. It indeed allowed the revealing of complex interlinked dynamics and the comparing of different implementations of the same programme. The framework is quite flexible and can be easily adapted to other MF programmes for ecosystems conservation, or more in general to green MF programmes. We also feel that it provides a logical map beyond green MF and it could be applied or developed also to assess certain aspects of other MF programmes, and more in general development intervention in a given territory and community. We hope that it could be useful and used by other researchers, consultants or institutions to assess and design programmes with more attention to collective dynamics and complex SES.
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